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"[Clhange of this magnitude is a journey. ,,
Today, employees are stuck between a rock and a hard place. On the one
hand, they are increasingly forced to sign pre-dispute arbitration agree-
ments--waiving the right to sue their employer in court--as a condition of their
employment. Employees who challenge their employers' conduct are subjected to
binding arbitration-an alternative to civil litigation that often does not offer the
full panoply of procedural protections.
On the other hand, employees seeking relief from the federal court system for
employer misconduct are increasingly finding the system inhospitable to their
claims. While the federal courts offer more robust procedural protections than
arbitration, the courts pose obstacles of their own. Heightened pleading standards
suggest that employees alleging intentional discrimination may have greater diffi-
culty merely surviving dismissal. Furthermore, at the trial and appellate levels,
the federal courts are overwhelmingly ruling in favor of employers against em-
* Suzette M. Malveaux is an Associate Professor of Law at the Columbus School of Law, at The
Catholic University of America. I am indebted to many for their support of this project. I am especially
grateful for the insights and invaluable feedback I received from: Cyrus Mehri, Esq., Joseph P. Moan,
Esq., Edward N. Gadsden, Jr., Dr. Irwin Goldstein, Professor Stephen J. Ware, Professor Peter Riley
and Professor Kevin M. Clermont. A special thanks for the excellent research assistance I received
from Elizabeth A. Edinger, Stephen Young and my research assistants, Lori Kreloff, Shira Lazinger,
Trish Gray and Lauren Nesbitt. I am very grateful for the administrative assistance of Janelle Salamon
and editorial assistance of Christina Semmer, Brittany Barrientos, and Miranda Fleschert. Thank you to
Dean Veryl Miles and the Columbus School of Law at The Catholic University of America for their
generous funding, and to the Metropolitan Washington Employment Lawyers' Association for enabl-
ing me to present on this topic at its annual conference held Mar. 13, 2009. Thanks also to the Wash-
ington & Lee University School of Law and the AALS Dispute Resolution Works-in-Progress Confe-
rence for inviting me to present my initial thoughts on this topic. And most importantly, I am grateful
for the love and support of my family and dear friends, without whom I could not do this work.
1. Alexis M. Herman et al., Ingram et al. v. The Coca-Cola Co., Fifth Annual Report of the Task
Force, No. 1-98-CV-3679 (RWS) (N.D. Ga. Dec. 1, 2006) [hereinafter Coke Fifth Task Force Report]
at 3, available at http://www.thecoca-colacompany.com/ourcompany/pdf/task-force-report 2003.pdf
(realization by Coke and independent Task Force that major change in the company's workplace
culture and processes would be necessary for Coke's historic employment discrimination class action
settlement agreement to be "truly successful over time").
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ployees who allege workplace discrimination.2 Overwhelmed and underfunded,
the EEOC-the administrative agency tasked with initial investigation and concil-
iation of employment discrimination claims-is often unable to resolve disputes
prior to litigation. The federal court system, a place to which plaintiffs have his-
torically flocked for relief from discrimination, turns out not to be a panacea ei-
ther.3
This puts employees in a bind. Employees fighting to avoid mandatory arbi-
tration in favor of federal court may end up going straight from the frying pan into
the fire-into a forum stacked against them. This presents the question of where
employees should go from here. Compulsory pre-dispute arbitration is an alterna-
tive to an inhospitable federal court system. But given the shortcomings of such
arbitration, are there any alternatives to the alternative worthy of consideration?
Yes: one-way binding arbitration.
4
This promising and unique alternative-while requiring employees to use ar-
bitration to resolve workplace disputes--gives the employee, but not the employ-
er, the option of rejecting the arbitrator's decision.5 In the event that the employee
is not satisfied with the outcome of arbitration, she can pursue her claim in the
court system. She is not bound by the arbitrator's determination. The employer,
on the other hand, is bound by the arbitrator's decision, whether the outcome is
favorable to the employer or not.6
This unilateral arrangement-voluntarily adopted by the Coca-Cola Compa-
ny 7 following its historic employment discrimination class action settlement-is a
groundbreaking and novel approach to promoting arbitration, while also protect-
ing employee choice and access to the court system. One-way binding arbitration
also offers employers an opportunity to forge new ground. Companies can enjoy
all of the benefits of arbitration--such as efficiency, privacy, cost savings and
litigation avoidance-while bolstering workplace relations that may enhance prof-
itability. The legal system also profits from arbitration arrangements that relieve
2. Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal
Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 103 (forthcoming Winter 2009), available at
www.hlpronline.com/Vol3.I/Clernont-SchwabHLPR.pdf [hereinafter Empirical Study].
3. See discussion infra at Part IIH and accompanying notes.
4. The term "one-way binding arbitration" is used by the author but not by the Coca-Cola Company
or the literature describing the Solutions program. For a definition of the term, see RONALD E. MALLEN
& JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 2.48, at 362 (Thompson/West 2008) (1996):
[Tihe parties may choose binding arbitration, agreeing that the decision will be final and binding
on both sides. Alternatively, the parties may agree that the result be binding on only one party,
which is 'one-way binding arbitration' leaving the other side free to seek a trial de novo if suffi-
ciently aggrieved by the result. Non-binding arbitration allows either party to seek further review.
5. The Coca-Cola Company's one-way binding arbitration is described as follows:
After hearing from both sides, the arbitrator makes a decision to resolve the Legal Dispute, much
like a judge would do in court. The employee then has a choice to agree to the arbitrator's deci-
sion and end the Legal Dispute, or to reject the decision and pursue other external options, in-
cluding legal action .... If the employee chooses to agree to the arbitrator's decision, the Com-
pany will be bound by that decision.
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administrative and judicial backlog, promote settlement, and recognize and recon-
cile competing dispute resolution systems.
While the scholarly literature is replete with discussion of the pros and cons
of mandatory arbitration and civil litigation, relative to one another, 8 there has
been no examination of one-way binding arbitration as a potential bridge between
these procedural poles. 9 The adoption of one-way arbitration by major corpora-
8. Only a sampling of the articles in the literature follows. See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, In De-
fense of Mandatory Binding Arbitration (If Imposed on the Company), 8 NEV. L.J. 82 (2007) (summa-
rizing arguments by critics and defenders of mandatory, pre-dispute arbitration, and proposing go-
vernmental mandatory arbitration imposed on companies, at the discretion of the "little guys"); Theo-
dore Eisenberg et al., Arbitration's Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in
Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 871, 871-77 (2007-2008) (summa-
rizing arguments on both sides). Compare Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It
Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631 (2005), Russell D. Feingold, Mandatory Arbitration: What Process is
Due?, 39 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 281 (2002); Jean R. Sterlight, The Rise and Spread of Mandatory Arbi-
tration as a Substitute for the Jury Trial, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 17 (2003), Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory
Binding Arbitration and the Demise of the Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury Trial, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON
DIsP. RESOL. 669 (2001), Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will
the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (2000), Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory
Arbitration of Individual Employee Rights: The Yellow Dog Contracts of the 1990s, 73 DENV. U. L.
REv. 1017 (1996), and Ronald Turner, Compulsory Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims
with Special Reference to the Three A's - Access, Adjudication, and Acceptability, 31 WAKE FOREST
L. REv. 231, 290 (1996), with Stephen J. Ware, The Case for Enforcing Adhesive Arbitration Agree-
ments - With Particular Consideration of Class Actions and Arbitration Fees, 5 J. AM. ARB. 251, 261
(2006), David Sherwyn, Mandatory Arbitration: Why Alternative Dispute Resolution May Be the Most
Equitable Way to Resolve Discrimination Claims, 6 CORNELL HOSPITALITY REPORT (July 2006),
available at http://www.hotelschool.comrne.edu/research/chr/pubs/reports/abstract-14081.html (last
visited Apr. 23, 2009), Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate over Pre-
dispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 559, 563 (2001), Stephen
J. Ware, The Effects of Gilmer: Empirical and Other Approaches to the Study ofEmploymentArbitra-
tion, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 735 (2001), Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory
Rules: Privatizing Law Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703 (1999), Lewis L. Maltby, Private
Justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights, 30 COLuM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 29, 63-64 (1998)
(contending that arbitration may be better than civil litigation for employees), and Stephen J. Ware,
Employment Arbitration and Voluntary Consent, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 83 (1996).
9. In many ways, arbitration and litigation are not at separate poles. If anything, arbitration---as a
type of ADR--is much more similar to litigation than other types, such as negotiation and mediation.
Professor Stephen J. Ware and others describe arbitration as a type of adjudication:
Arbitration, like litigation, is a form of adjudication. The difference between the two is that arbi-
tration is private adjudication, while litigation is government adjudication. In both processes, a
non-party decisionmaker resolves the dispute. In arbitration, the decisionmaker is one or more
arbitrators; in litigation it is the court, i.e., a judge and, sometimes, a jury.
Adjudication typically produces winners and losers, and the losers may refuse to comply with the
adjudicator's decision. When losers defy the ruling of a court, the process for enforcement is
well-known. The sheriff or marshal enforces the court's ruling by seizing property, putting a per-
son in jail, or forcibly enjoining a person from doing something. The same enforcement process
occurs when the loser at arbitration defies the arbitrator's decision. The winner at arbitration peti-
tions the court for an order confirming the arbitration award. Through confirmation, the court
adopts the arbitrator's decision as its own, and that decision is enforced like any other ruling of
the court.
Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through Arbitration, supra note 8, at
707-708; see also Stephen J. Ware, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION §2.1 at 19 (West Group
2001) ("Arbitration is private adjudication."); IAN R. MACNEIL, ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW:
AGREEMENTS, AWARDS, AND REMEDIES UNDER THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT, § 2.1.2, at 2:5
(Little Brown & Co. 1999 Supp.) ("Arbitration is generally understood to be a kind of adjudicatory
process .... ); David S. Schwartz, Symposium, If You Love Arbitration, Set it Free: How "Mandato-
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tions, such as the Coca-Cola Company and Texaco, to resolve workplace disputes
following some of the most high profile, historic employment discrimination cas-
es, suggests that an examination of this alternative is long overdue. The goal of
this article is to fill that void.
This article is comprised of six parts. Part I introduces the topic. Part II ex-
amines the growing prevalence of compulsory pre-dispute arbitration agreements
in employment contracts and the problems with such agreements. Part III de-
scribes the challenges employees face in the federal court system: higher pleading
thresholds for intentional discrimination claims, the federal judiciary's current
antagonism toward employee claims of discrimination (as demonstrated by recent
empirical studies), and a beleaguered EEOC. Part IV describes how Coke adopted
one-way binding arbitration and explores the ways in which this alternative is
preferable to both mandatory arbitration and civil litigation for employees, em-
ployers, and the greater legal community.' 0 Part V discusses some limitations of
one-way binding arbitration and the context in which it has the most potential.
Finally, Part VI concludes by recommending that employers consider adopting
one-way binding arbitration with sufficient procedural safeguards as a way of
maximizing employee choice, empowering the company to resolve workplace
issues internally, and bridging the divide between litigation and arbitration.
HI. COMPULSORY PRE-DISPUTE ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
A. The Prevalence and Evolution of Mandatory Arbitration Agreements
There has been a proliferation of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agree-I
ments in employment contracts over the last fifteen years. At least one-fifth of12
all employees are subject to mandatory arbitration. The increase in such agree-
ry" Undermines "Arbitration," 8 NEV. L.J. 400, 402 (2007) (describing 'judicialization of arbitra-
tion").
10. The article uses a case-study methodology to explore the utility of one-way binding arbitration.
Through interviews with counsel and third-party experts, and company documents, the author was able
to use Coke's dispute resolution process as an exemplar.
11. See, e.g., Nancy Levit, Megacases, Diversity, and the Elusive Goal of Workplace Reform, 49
B.C. L. REV. 367, 412 (2008) [hereinafter Megacases] ("Employers are increasingly requiring em-
ployees unrepresented by unions-and even union-represented employees who are under a collective
bargaining agreement that contains a clear waiver of statutory rights-to arbitrate their employment
discrimination claims"); Theodore Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, Arbitration and Litigation of Employ-
ment Claims: An Empirical Comparison, 58 Disp. REs. J. 44, 44 (Nov. 2003 - Jan. 2004); Mei L.
Bickner et al., Developments in Employment Arbitration, 52 J. DiSP. RESOL. 8, 78 (1997); Theodore
Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight from Arbitration: An Empirical Study of Ex Ante Arbitra-
tion Clauses in the Contracts of Publicly Held Companies, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 335, 348-50, T.2
(2007) (review of 2,858 corporate contracts revealed that employment contracts are more likely to have
arbitration clauses than other types of contracts; arbitration clauses appeared in 37 percent of employ-
ment contracts (the highest percentage among the thirteen contract types studied), but appeared in only
11 percent of all the corporate contracts studied).
12. Press Release, National Employment Lawyers Association, NELA Applauds Bill Banning Man-
datory Arbitration (July 12, 2007), available at http:llwww.nela.orgltemplts_78396BF6-BDB9-505B-
D137F90CE69C8B2378396C06-BDB9-505B-
DCB26F870980157F/NELAStatementArbitrationFaimessAct0707.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 2009)
(quoting NELA President, Kathleen L. Bogas); see also Megacases, supra note 11, at 412-13 ("Man-
datory arbitration is pervasive: one survey of Fortune 1000 companies some years ago revealed that
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ments has led to an unparalleled privatization of the justice system, which threat-
ens to undermine civil rights enforcement. Because of the judiciary's propensity
to enforce pre-dispute compulsory arbitration agreements, employees are increa-
singly precluded from having their claims heard in court, relegated instead to arbi-
tration-a forum often lacking procedural features that promote vigorous civil
rights enforcement.
Initially, arbitration agreements under the Federal Arbitration Act
("FAA")-enacted in 1925--served as a method of alternative dispute resolution
("ADR") between commercial entities of equal bargaining power, matched in
business experience and sophistication. Within this context, the parties would
agree to resolve future disputes in arbitration, a method which can be faster and
less expensive than litigation.
The FAA's reach was initially limited. At first, the Supreme Court and lower
courts resisted arbitration, doubting the arbitrator's capacity to adequately protect
statutory rights and perceiving the forum as inferior to the judiciary. Prior to the
1980s, courts would ignore the FAA or openly resist forcing parties to arbitrate.
The Supreme Court itself set a tone of distrust and disdain for the alternative fo-
rum. For example, in Wilko v. Swan,t 3 the Court held that the right to select a
judicial forum is non-waivable, thereby making a pre-dispute arbitration agree-
ment between securities brokers and buyers an impermissible "stipulation" bind-
ing buyers to waive compliance with the Securities Act of 1933.1 The Supreme
Court believed that arbitrators, not instructed in the applicable law, might be relied
upon to make subjective findings and interpretations of the law-an unacceptable
risk in the absence of meaningful judicial review.' 5 The Court expressed similar
reservations about arbitration in the collective bargaining context.1
6
However, the Supreme Court's hesitancy to enforce pre-dispute arbitration
agreements has drastically waned over the last forty years. 17 The Court's shift in
direction is demonstrated by Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc., in which it held that claims brought under the Sherman Act for antitrust vi-
olations were subject to arbitration, pursuant to an arbitration agreement in an
seventy-nine percent of them used arbitration"); see also Alternative Dispute Resolution: Most Large
Employers Prefer ADR as Alternative to Litigation, Survey Says, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 93, at
A4 (May 14, 1997).
In light of the Supreme Court's recent ruling in 14 Penn Plaza LLC. v. Pyett, even more employees
may be required to arbitrate their statutory employment discrimination claims. See 129 S. Ct. 1456
(2009). In Pyett, the Supreme Court held enforceable a mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clause in a
union-negotiated collective bargaining agreement, that waived an employee's right to file a discrimina-
tion claim under the ADEA. Id. at 1474. The Pyett Court determined that a collective bargaining
agreement can waive an employee's right to bring federal claims of employment discrimination in
court so long as the waiver is clear and unmistakable. Id. Thus, a union can bind an employee, through
its collective bargaining agreement, to mandatory, pre-dispute arbitration.
13. 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S.
477 (1989).
14. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 434-37.
15. Id. at 435-37.
16. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 56-58 (1974).
17. See Ware, Employment Arbitration and Voluntary Consent, supra note 8, at 137 (discussing the
"Court's strongly pro-arbitration decisions of the last twenty years"); Richard A. Bales, Compulsory
Arbitration of Employment Claims: A Practical Guide to Designing and Implementing Enforceable
Agreements, 47 BAYLOR L. REV. 591, 593 (1995) ("employers and employees are increasingly enter-
ing into, and courts are increasingly enforcing, compulsory arbitration agreements").
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international commercial agreement and governed by the FAA. 18 So long as the
arbitral forum enabled a party to vindicate statutory rights, the statute would serve
its remedial and deterrent functions, and the arbitration agreement could be en-
forced. 19 The Court radically departed from its initial reluctance, and instead em-
braced the "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.,
20
Growing acceptance of arbitration became the norm. By 1989, the Court
overturned Wilko in Rodriguez De Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.,
putting an end to "the old judicial hostility to arbitration.",2' In Rodriguez De
Quijas, the Court concluded that once "the outmoded presumption of disfavoring
arbitration" was cast aside, it became clear that the right to select the judicial fo-
rum was not paramount to Securities Act enforcement. 22 So long as no inherent
conflict existed between the federal statute and the arbitral forum, the arbitration
clause was enforceable.23 The Court recognized that long-held skepticism over
arbitration "has been steadily eroded over the years. ... ,24 Moreover, the Court's
more recent decisions, upholding agreements to arbitrate claims under various
federal statutes, indicate that this erosion has intensified.25
The Court's fondness for arbitration has become commonplace over the last
quarter-century. 26 This shift in attitude has taken place in the employment con-
text, among others. In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,27 the Court concluded
that arbitration in the collective bargaining context was inferior to the federal
court system for resolving Title VII claims. Almost two decades later, the Court,
in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., held that statutory employment dis-
crimination claims covered by a pre-dispute arbitration agreement could be re-
18. 473 U.S. 614, 628-36 (1985). This was "the first time the Court has considered the question of
whether a standard arbitration clause referring to claims arising out of or relating to a contract should
be construed to cover statutory claims that have only an indirect relationship to the contract." Id. at 647
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
19. Id. at 625, 628, 637. The Court noted, "we are well past the time when judicial suspicion of the
desirability of arbitration and of the competence of arbitral tribunals inhibited the development of
arbitration as an alternative means of dispute resolution." Id. at 626-27.
For a discussion of the constitutionality of mandatory arbitration see Richard C. Reuben, Constitution-
al Gravity: A Unitary Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution and Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L.
REV. 949, 1050-86, 991 (2000) (describing due process requirements for private arbitration); Dwight
Golann, Making Alternative Dispute Resolution Mandatory: The Constitutional Issues, 68 OR. L. REV.
487, 534-40 (1989) (describing how statutorily mandated arbitration can comport with due process).
20. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983); see also Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985) ("The preeminent concern of Congress in
passing the Act was to enforce private agreements into which parties had entered, and that concern
requires that we rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate .... ).
21. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 480 (1989) (quoting Kulu-
kundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 985 (2d Cir. 1942)).
22. Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S at 481-82.
23. Id. at 481,483.
24. Id. at 480.
25. See id. at 480-81 (discussing trend of upholding agreements to arbitrate claims under acts such
as: the Securities Act of 1933 (Rodriguez De Quijas); the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and RICO
(Shearson/An. Express, Inc.); and the Sherman Act (Mitsubishi Motors Corp.)).
26. See, e.g., Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985) (stating that FAA "re-
quires that we rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate"); Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) ("[Q]uestions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy
regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration").
27. See Gardner Denver, 415 U.S. 36, 56-58 (concluding in collective bargaining context that arbi-
tration was less appropriate than the federal court system for resolving Title VII claims).
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solved in the arbitral rather than judicial forum.28 In Gilmer, as a condition of his
employment, the New York Stock Exchange required a securities broker to sign a
contract, obligating the broker to arbitrate all employment-related disputes, in-
cluding statutory discrimination claims. 29 In striking contrast to Gardner-Denver,
the Court embraced the "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements"
and required the broker to arbitrate the claims he brought under the Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA").3 ° Most recently, in 14 Penn Plaza
L.L.C. v. Pyett,31 the Court "corrected" Gardner-Denver's "misconceptions" about
the drawbacks of the arbitral forum and held that a mandatory pre-dispute arbitra-
tion agreement in a collective bargaining agreement, whose coverage of ADEA
claims was clear and unmistakable, was enforceable.
32
The Court has endorsed the use of arbitration in just about every kind of civil
dispute over which a court could have jurisdiction.33 The Court has interpreted
the FAA as expressing a strong preference for the private resolution of claims
brought to enforce rights in areas as varied as securities, 34 antitrust, 35 consumer
protection 36 and civil rights.
37
As a result, employers have been increasingly conditioning employment on
an individual's willingness to waive his right to sue his employer in court. The
Court's endorsement of arbitration has contributed to a burgeoning practice by
employers to insert mandatory arbitration clauses in their standardized, non-
negotiable contracts--compelling employees to prospectively forgo the option of
using the courts to vindicate rights which may be infringed upon in the future.
B. The Problems with Mandatory Pre-Dispute Arbitration
The Supreme Court has repeatedly encouraged judicial deference to contract
enforcement-38 -leaving only state law theories 39 and limited review of arbitral
awards as means for challenging such contracts of adhesion.40 The FAA makes
clear that arbitration agreements are "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save
28. 500 U.S. 20, 24-36 (1991).
29. Id. at 20.
30. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24).
31. 129 S. Ct. 145 (2009).
32. Id. at 1471.
33. See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109 (2001) (upholding mandatory
arbitration provision by construing exception to the FAA to ensure that persons with employment
claims in non-unionized workplaces would be covered by the Act).
34. See, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 480-81 (Securities Act of 1933); Shearson/Am. Ex-
press Inc., 482 U.S. at 220 (the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and RICO).
35. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 614 (the Sherman Act).
36. See Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90, 92 (2000) (arbitration agreement
covering statutory claims asserted under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) and the Equal Credit Oppor-
tunity Act (ECOA) was enforceable).
37. See, e.g., Gilmer, 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991) (ADEA); see also Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams,
532 U.S. 105, 111 (2001) ("contract evidencing a transaction involving interstate commerce" described
in 9 U.S.C. § 2 of the FAA includes employment contracts).
38. See, e.g., Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26.
39. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motor Corp., 473 U.S. at 627.
40. See Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 232 (1987) ("although judicial
scrutiny of arbitration awards necessarily is limited, such review is sufficient to ensure that arbitrators
comply with the requirements of the statute").
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upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any con-
tract., 41 The arbitrator's decision is generally binding and subject only to appeal
on limited contractual grounds such as fraud, duress, bias, or unconscionability.42
Moreover, the Supreme Court has rejected challenges to arbitration on a
number of significant grounds. For example, in Mitsubishi, the Court approved
the enforcement of arbitration, despite such arguments that: the arbitration agree-
ment failed to expressly provide which statutory claims it covered; 43 the underly-
ing issues were too complex for the arbitrator; 44 and the arbitrator might be in-
competent, non-conscientious, or biased.45 In Gilmer, the Court also endorsed
arbitration despite arguments that: the underlying statute was designed to advance
important broad public policies; 46 arbitration would undermine the enforcement
agency's role;4 7 arbitration only provided limited discovery, thereby compromis-
ing a party's ability to prove statutory violations; 48 the ?arties did not have equal
bargaining power;4 9 arbitration provided limited review; 0 the arbitrator lacked the
power to provide broad equitable relief and certify class actions;51 and the arbitra-
tor's failure to issue written opinions would result in public ignorance about a
defendant's conduct, the plaintiffs inability to secure adequate appellate review,
and a stifled development of the law.
52
While supporters of arbitratior--largely employers and corporations--tout its
speed, cost, and flexibility,53 they fail to mention the risk that arbitration will dis-
pense with many rights ordinarily available-and often taken for granted-in the
courts. More specifically, mandatory binding arbitration can, and in some cir-
cumstances will, dispense with the right to a jury trial, a public and subsidized
forum, a written record, discovery, binding legal precedents, opportunity for col-
lective and class actions, an adjudicator with legal expertise, and meaningful ap-
pellate review.54 Each of these features, standard in the judicial forum, can be
compromised or eliminated altogether in the arbitral forum.
41. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
42. See Doctor's Assocs. Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996); see also E. Assoc. Coal Corp.
v. United Mine Workers of Am., Dist. 17, 531 U.S. 57, 63-67 (2000) (in collective bargaining context,
Court demonstrated traditional deference to arbitrator's award by holding that it was not a violation of
public policy for arbitrator to reinstate-in a safety-sensitive position--an employee who had twice
tested positive for marijuana use); 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (an arbitral award is granted full faith and credit
and can only be overturned on the basis of very narrow grounds).
43. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 624-25.
44. Id. at 633-34.
45. Id. at 634; see also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 30 (citing Mitsubishi
Motor Corp., 473 U.S. at 634).
46. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 27-28.
47. Id. at 28-29.
48. Id. at 31.
49. Id. at 32-33.
50. Id. at 32 n.4.
51. Id. at 32.
52. Id. at 31-32.
53. For an interesting discussion of how litigation, like arbitration, can be customized, see Michael
L. Moffitt, Customized Litigation: The Case for Making Civil Procedure Negotiable, 75 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 461 (2007).
54. See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 435-37 (1953) (expressing concern that arbitrators must
make findings without "judicial instruction on the law[, an arbitrator's] ... award may be made with-
out explanation of their reasons and without a complete record of their proceedings .... conception of
the legal meaning of ... statutory requirements ... cannot be examined[,] .. .power to vacate an
[Vol. 2009
No. 1] Is it the "Real Thing"?
Plaintiffs, unaware of the deleterious consequences of signing such an agree-
ment, may be forced to accept unfavorable terms such as exorbitant costs,55 class
action prohibitions,56 and proscribed statutory remedies.57 Employees with little
bargaining power are mandated to forego their day in court because they signed an
arbitration clause that appeared in fine print, on the back of a form or application,
in incomprehensible legalese.5 8
C. Legislative Attempts to Limit Mandatory Pre-Dispute Arbitration
In response to a groundswell of dissatisfaction on the part of consumer and
employee rights groups, 59 congressional leaders have sought to fix the problem of
compulsory pre-dispute arbitration agreements that impact the enforcement of
award is limited" and their interpretations of law are not subject to judicial review "for error in inter-
pretation"), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989);
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 57-58 (1974) (expressing concern over factfinding
process in arbitration of Title VII disputes in the labor context because "[tihe record of the arbitration
proceedings is not as complete; the usual rules of evidence do not apply; and rights and procedures
common to civil trials, such as discovery, compulsory process, cross-examination, and testimony under
oath, are often severely limited or unavailable").
55. But see, Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000) (recognizing that an
arbitration agreement that would impose large costs on a party opposed to arbitration may render the
agreement unenforceable).
56. See Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala., 244 F.3d 814, 819 (11th Cir. 2001). However,
advocacy groups challenging the enforceability of arbitration agreements that ban class actions have
enjoyed recent success. The unenforceability of class action waivers in such agreements has gained
traction in the Ninth, Second and Third Circuits. See, e.g., Homa v. Am. Express Co., 558 F.3d 225
(2009) (class action waiver unconscionable under application of state law and on public policy
grounds); In re Am. Express Merchants' Litig., 554 F.3d 300 (2009) (class action waiver unenforcea-
ble where it would effectively preclude vindication of statutory rights for small claims); Ting v.
AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1147-52 (9th Cir. 2003) (class action waiver held procedurally and substantive-
ly unconscionable under California state law); see also Linda S. Mullenix, Class Action Waivers,
NAT'L L.J. 23 (Apr. 6, 2009) (discussing same).
57. See THOMAS H. OEHMKE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, § 151:3, at 151-55 (West Publishing
Group 2004) (1987) (discussing circuit split between Ninth Circuit and others over proper way to
address remedial restrictions in arbitration agreements). See, e.g., Graham Oil Co. v. ARCO Prods.
Co., a Div. of Atl. Richfield Co., 43 F.3d 1244, 1247-48 (9th Cir. 1994) (arbitration clause that short-
ened statute of limitations and limited punitive damages and attorney's fees, in contravention of the
Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, held unenforceable); Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 64
(1st Cir. 2006) (arbitration agreement provisions that barred treble damages, prohibited class actions,
and limited attorneys' fees prevented plaintiffs from vindicating their statutory rights under federal
antitrust law and were therefore severed).
58. See Statement of F. Paul Bland, Jr., Testimony to the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the
United States Senate Judiciary Committee S. 1782, The Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, (Dec. 12,
2007), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=3055&witid=6829, (de-
scribing clauses "(a) cast in dense and cryptic legalese incomprehensible to lay persons (and even
many lawyers); (b) set forth in miniscule print, often on the back side of a document; and (c) buried in
the center of a mailing .... ").
59. See, e.g., Public Citizen, Groups Launch Nationwide Effort to Stop Use of Binding Mandatory
Arbitration Clauses: Campaign Includes Educational Web Sites, Call for State and Federal Legislation,
Tools to Empower Consumers (Feb. 24, 2005), available at
http://www.citizen.org/pressroom/release.cfmID=-1884 (ten-point platform for action released by
numerous groups encouraging consumers to avoid doing business with companies that use binding
mandatory arbitration clauses); National Employment Lawyers Association, supra note 12, at 4 (listing
concerns and "urg[ing] Congress to ban the practice of mandatory arbitration by enacting the Arbitra-
tion Fairness Act without delay").
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civil rights and consumer laws. In particular, the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009
("AFA")6° -introduced on Feb. 12, 2009, to the llth Congress-would amend
the FAA to make unenforceable any pre-dispute arbitration agreement dealing
with consumer disputes, employment and franchise disputes, or disputes arising
under laws that protect civil rights. 6' The AFA's congressional findings state that
"a large and rapidly growing number of corporations are requiring millions of
consumers and employees to give up their right to have disputes resolved by a
judge or jury, and instead submit their claims to binding arbitration."62 While the
AFA does not distinguish between binding and non-binding mandatory pre-
dispute arbitration agreements, its findings indicate that legislators are concerned
with agreements that force employees to "give up their rights" and require em-
ployees to use arbitration as a substitute for civil litigation 6--something not re-
quired by Coke's one-way binding arbitration provision64 in its internal dispute
resolution program.65 Under the AFA, mandatory pre-dispute arbitration of em-
ployment claims outside of collective bargaining agreements would be prohi-
bited.66
While mandatory pre-dispute arbitration has been successfully curtailed by
legislation for certain discrete groups--such as auto dealers, 67 livestock produc-
ers, 68 and covered members of the armed forces and their dependents subjected to
payday loan agreements 6 9 -it has not gained the same traction for employees.7 °
60. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 11 lth Cong. (2009) (sponsored by Rep. Henry C.
"Hank" Johnson, Jr.).
61. Id. Another pending bill, the Civil Rights Act of 2008 ("CRA"), also prohibits mandatory, pre-
dispute arbitration agreements in employment contracts. See Civil Rights Act of 2008, H.R. 5129 §
423, 111 th Cong. (2008) ("[A]ny clause of any agreement between an employer and employee that
requires arbitration of a dispute arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States shall not be
enforceable"). However, post-dispute agreements to arbitrate are permissible, and collective bargaining
agreements are exempt. See id.
62. H.R. 1020 at 2 (emphasis added).
63. Id.
64. See Coke Rules, supra note 5, at 5, 20-21.
65. A substantially similar version of the AFA received bipartisan support from the 110th Congress.
See Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, S. 1782, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 3010, 110th Cong. (2007).
The AFA of 2007 differs from the pending bill, in that the prior bill also prohibited mandatory pre-
dispute arbitration agreements that "regulate contracts or transactions between parties of unequal
bargaining power." H.R. 3010. For a history of the AFA, see Court Rules, 249 F.R.D. 402 (2008).
66. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, S. 1782, supra note 65; H.R. 3010, supra note 65.
67. The Motor Vehicle Franchise Contract Arbitration Fairness Act of 2002, Automobile Dealers'
Day in Court Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1226 (2002):
(a) Election of arbitration... (2) Consent required: Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
whenever a motor vehicle franchise contract provides for the use of arbitration to resolve a con-
troversy arising out of or relating to such contract, arbitration may be used to settle such contro-
versy only if after such controversy arises all parities to such controversy consent in writing to
use arbitration to settle such controversy.
68. Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, 7 U.S.C. § 197c(a) (2006) ("Any livestock or
poultry contract that contains a provision requiring the use of arbitration to resolve any controversy
that may arise under the contract shall contain a provision that allows a producer or grower, prior to
entering the contract to decline to be bound by the arbitration provision").
69. John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, H.R. 5122, 109th Cong.
(2006), 10 U.S.C. § 987 (f(4) (2006):
Notwithstanding [9 U.S.C. § 2], or any other Federal or State law, rule, or regulation, no agree-
ment to arbitrate any dispute involving the extension of consumer credit shall be enforceable
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Given the legislature's mixed success in quelling the surge of compulsory pre-
dispute arbitration agreements among those of unequal bargaining power or those
pursuing certain claims, the courts will continue to evaluate the legitimacy of such
agreements on a case-by-case basis.
The federal judiciary's deference to contract enforcement suggests that many,
if not most, of these agreements will pass muster. While the enforceability of an
arbitration agreement is contingent upon its specific features, unless those features
are particularly egregious, 7' courts will often determine that the contract suffices.
I. CIVIL LITIGATION
Given the concerns over lack of meaningful employee consent and meaning-
ful review, and the terms of the mandatory pre-dispute agreements themselves,
employee advocates have properly focused on protecting employees from forced
participation in binding arbitration and safeguarding their right to a judicial fo-
rum.7 2 This focus is not surprising given the important role the federal judiciary
has historically played in protecting civil rights plaintiffs and the forum's benefi-
cial procedural features. For example, employees have benefited greatly from the
right to jury trial, which provides a public subsidized forum, extensive access to
evidence via discovery, binding legal precedents, broad collective and class relief,
and significant appellate review.
While the federal judiciary has been a long-time friend of employees victi-
mized by discrimination, the honeymoon may be over. In the event that an em-
ployee successfully persuades the court that a mandatory pre-dispute arbitration
agreement is unenforceable, escaping binding arbitration may lead the employee
into another trap-a judicial system inhospitable to employment discrimination
against any covered member or dependent of such a member, or any person who was a covered
member or dependent of that member when the agreement was made.
70. Other groups, such as residents of nursing homes and car purchasers and leasers are attempting
to enact prohibitions against mandatory, pre-dispute arbitration. See Fairness in Nursing Home Arbitra-
tion Act of 2008, S. 3828, 110th Cong. (2008) ("A pre-dispute arbitration agreement between a long-
term care facility and a resident of facility long-term care facility (or anyone acting on behalf of such
resident, including a person with financial responsibility for such resident) shall not be valid or specifi-
cally enforceable"); Automobile Arbitration Fairness Act of 2008, H.R. 5312, 110th Cong. (2008) (a
controversy arising out of a motor vehicle consumer sales or lease contract "may not be settled by
arbitration unless, after such controversy arises, all the parties to such controversy agree in writing to
settle such controversy by arbitration").
71. See, e.g., Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 938-40 (4th Cir. 1999) (arbitration
agreement unenforceable because so one-sided in favor of employer, where employer alone could
control selection process of arbitrators (including family and friends), punish arbitrators that ruled
against it, expand scope of arbitration, move to dismiss, record proceedings, move to vacate or modify
award, and cancel arbitration agreement; and employee alone was required to file notice of claim and
defenses, and provide list of fact witnesses and anticipated testimony); Ramirez-De-Arellano v. Am.
Airlines, Inc. 133 F.3d 89, 91 (1st Cir. 1997) (where employee was denied a hearing, discovery, and
any review and arbitrator was not a disinterested party, court concerned about "fundamental fairness"
of process).
72. See, e.g., Press Release, Public Citizen, Public Citizen Urges Support for the Arbitration Fairness
Act of 2007, (July 12, 2007), available at http://www.citizen.org/pressroom/release.cfm?ID=2472 (last
visited Apr. 5, 2009) ("The insertion by business entities of arbitration clauses in everyday contracts
forces individuals to forgo their right to a court or jury if... workplaces harm them").
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claims. Recent empirical studies and case law suggest that employees may not be
well-served by running from arbitration into the arms of the judiciary.
73
Rather than offering a panacea replete with procedural protections, the federal
court system has a number of its own deficiencies. First, under the new heigh-
tened pleading standard established by the Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly,74 an employee challenging intentional employment discrimination may
risk having his case dismissed more so than plaintiffs bringing other types of cases
because of the subjective nature of the claim. To the extent that Twombly is ap-
plied to civil rights cases, such cases may have a harder time surviving dismissal
because of their dependence on circumstantial evidence. Second, if an em-
ployee's discrimination claim survives early dismissal, he is more likely to lose at
trial than other plaintiffs.75 Third, even if the employee wins at trial, he is more
than four times more likely to have his victory reversed on appeal than the em-
ployer.76 Finally, employees are not afforded a meaningful opportunity to avoid
this fate with the help of the EEOC in investigating and conciliating workplace
disputes prior to civil filing.
A. Heightened Pleading Standard
As an initial matter, employees run the risk that their complaints will not
overcome the judiciary's pleading standard. Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure requires a complaint to contain only "a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."77 Cases subject to a
heightened pleading requirement fall under Rule 9(b)-which requires particulari-
ty for cases involving fraud, mistake, 78 or an applicable statute. 79 Consequently,
the Supreme Court set forth a low notice pleading bar in Conley v. Gibson, which
stated that "a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless
it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his
claim which would entitle him to relief."80 Despite the notice pleading standard
set forth in Rule 8 and Supreme Court case law reiterating this standard,8' lower
73. Empirical Study, supra note 2.
74. 550 U.S. 544 (2007); see infra, Part A: Heightened Pleading Standard, for a detailed discussion
of this standard.
75. See infra, Part B: Trial, for a more detailed discussion.
76. See infra, Part C: Appeals, for a more detailed discussion.
77. FaD. R. CIv. P. 8(a)(2).
78. "In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting
fraud or mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person's mind may be alleged
generally." FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
79. For example, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 requires that a party pleading
securities fraud state claims with sufficient particularity and provide allegations of "scienter" consis-
tent with the terms of the statute. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) (1998) (complaint must provide "each state-
ment alleged to have been misleading, (2) the reason or reasons why the statement is misleading, and
(3) if an allegation regarding the statement or omission is made on information and belief, the com-
plaint shall state with particularity all facts on which that belief is formed"); 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)
("the complaint shall, with respect to each act or omission alleged to violate this chapter, state with
particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of
mind").
80. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,45-46 (1957).
81. See id.
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courts have subjected plaintiffs filing discrimination claims to greater scrutiny.
8 2
Because of the lower courts' persistence in applying a heightened pleading re-
quirement to civil rights cases, the Supreme Court has had to refute this practice to
bring the courts back in line.
8 3
However, in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, the Court recently rejected the Conley
v. Gibson's "no set of facts" standard, declaring that "after puzzling the profession
for 50 years, this famous observation has earned its retirement." 84 The Court con-
cluded that "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above
the speculative level" 85 and must show "plausibility of entitle[ment] to relief," not
just a "possibility. 86 A complaint must give the defendant fair notice of the na-
ture of plaintiffs claim and the grounds upon which it rests. 87 While detailed
factual allegations are not necessary,8 8 under Twombly, "a plaintiff's obligation to
provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of a cause of action's elements will not
do." Moreover, "Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a 'showing,' rather than a blanket
assertion, of entitlement to relief."90 The Twombly standard is a marked change
from the liberal pleading standard that permitted a plaintiff to state a claim using
conclusory statements and bare-bones facts to be fleshed out in discovery and
examined through summary judgment.
Under Twombly, employees challenging intentional discrimination are more
vulnerable to having their claims dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6), for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, because of the more rigorous
"plausibility" pleading standard. In the event that employees' claims are sub-
82. See A. Benjamin Spencer, Pleading Civil Rights Claims in the Post-Conley Era, 52 HOw. L.J.
99, 111-18 (2008); see also Eric K. Yamamoto, Efficiency's Threat to the Value of Accessible Courts
for Minorities, 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 341 (1990) (describing deleterious effect heightened
pleading standard was having on civil rights cases in the 1980s).
83. See, e.g., Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S.
163, 168 (1993); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513-15 (2002).
84. Bell Ati. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 (2007). In the context of a putative antitrust class
action, the Court concluded that plaintiffs failed to state a claim under Section 1 of the Sherman Act
because the complaint did not allege enough factual matter that, taken as true, would suggest that an
agreement was made-a necessary condition for a statutory violation. Id. at 554-58.
85. Id. at 555.
86. Id. at 557 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004)).
87. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
88. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also Conley, 355 U.S. at 47.
89. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
90. Id. at 556 n.3.
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jected to the Twombly standard, such claims are in potential jeopardy9' for numer-
ous reasons.
92
First, the Twombly standard is harder for employees who bring employment
discrimination claims than for plaintiffs who bring other types of claims because
employers often have superior, if not exclusive, access to the evidence necessary
to demonstrate plausibility. For example, in disparate treatment cases--the vast
majority of employment discrimination cases9 3-- plaintiffs must allege facts suffi-
cient to show discriminatory intent-facts often solely in the defendant's posses-
sion. 94 Given that modem day discrimination is often subtle,95 and consequently
difficult to prove,9 6 plaintiffs run the risk that they will not be able to put forth
factual allegations sufficient to survive a post-Twombly 12(b)(6) dismissal.
Second, while plaintiffs may successfully allege facts consistent with discrim-
ination, such facts may also be consistent with non-discrimination. Twombly re-
quires plaintiffs to allege facts that show a claim is plausible, not just possible. 97
Therefore, if a court is so inclined, it may dismiss a civil rights complaint which
alleges facts that lend themselves to explanations other than discrimination.
Third, the interpretation of what is "plausible" is highly subjective, thereby
making it easier for judges suspicious of discrimination claims to dismiss them
outright, prior to the claims being fleshed out in discovery or vetted through sum-
mary judgment. Given potential differences in perception based on background
factors, such as race 98 and gender,99 judges may have very different views-from
91. It is unclear at this early juncture whether civil rights cases are being subjected to a heightened
pleading standard post-Twombly, and consequently being disproportionately dismissed. See Spencer,
supra note 82, at 155-59. See, e.g., Kendall W. Hannon, Much Ado About Twombly? A Study on the
Impact of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly on 12(b)(6) Motions, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1811, 1815
(2008) (preliminary study shows a "significant departure from previous dismissal practice is [in] the
civil rights field" post-Twombly); Joseph A. Seiner, The Trouble With Twombly: A Proposed Pleading
Standard for Employment Discrimination Cases, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=1273713 (preliminary study examining dismissal rates pre and post Twombly
reveals a "substantial increase" in dismissal rate of employment discrimination cases) (last visited on
Apr. 10, 2009). See also Nathan Koppel, Job Discrimination Cases Tend to Fare Poorly in Federal
Court, WALL ST. J., Feb. 19, 2009, at A16.
92. Civil rights cases are also vulnerable to dismissal because they are often brought pursuant to
Section 1983, which provides for qualified immunity. Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009)
(describing qualified immunity standard for Section 1983 claim). Cases in which qualified immunity is
a potential defense are also more susceptible to a heightened pleading standard. See Spencer, supra
note 82.
93. Empirical Study, supra note 2, at 103 (citing John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The
Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 989, 998, n.57
(1991)).
94. Spencer, supra note 82, at 160-61.
95. See Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental Corp., 85 F.3d 1074, 1082 (3d Cir. 1996) ("Discrimination
continues to pollute the social and economic mainstream of American life, and is often simply masked
in more subtle forms").
96. See Cyrus Mehri & Ellen Eardley, 21st Century Tools for Advancing Equal Opportunity: Rec-
omimendations for the Next Administration, at 1-3 (discussing subtle or "second generation" discrimi-
nation and ways of combating it), available at http://www.acslaw.org/node/7476 (last visited Apr. 9,
2009).
97. Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007).
98. See, e.g., Jon Cohen & Jennifer Agiesta, 3 in 10 Americans Admit to Race Bias: Survey Shows
Age, Too, May Affect Election Views, WASH. POST, June 22, 2008, at AI ("More than six in ten Afri-
can Americans now rate race relations as 'not so good' or 'poor,' while 53 percent of whites hold more
positive views").
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the plaintiff and each other---on whether the plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to
show that discrimination plausibly occurred.' 0 Indeed, the empirical evidence
discussed below lends support to the notion that some federal judges view em-
ployment discrimination claims unfavorably.
In sum, despite the transsubstantivel ° t nature of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the courts' application of such rules has historically not been even-
handed. As gatekeepers, judges may prevent civil rights cases from entering the
pipeline on the grounds that a plaintiffs'd factual allegations do not demonstrate
plausible discrimination.
The judiciary's renewed opportunity for subjecting employment discrimina-
tion complaints to heightened pleading scrutiny creates a risk that efficiency will
trump justice. The Twombly Court's rationale for the plausibility standard
stemmed from its concern about the potentially exorbitant costs of discovery in
the large, putative antitrust class action at issue, 1 2 and the Court's inability to
weed out such a case early in discovery if it was groundless. 0 3 In addition to cost,
the Supreme Court was also concerned about potential discovery abuse,1°4 despite
the fact that the record did not indicate potential ill will or manipulation by the
plaintiffs. These concerns suggest that not only judicial economy, but judicial
suspicion of plaintiffs and their counsel, influenced the Twombly Court.
At this juncture, Twombly seems to have created a "notice plus" pleading
standard, requiring factual allegations to go beyond Rule 8's mere "notice" plead-
ing, while allowing the allegations to fall short of Rule 9's "particularized notice"
pleading requirement.11 5 Consequently, federal judges-empowered as gatekee-
pers--may prevent employment discrimination cases from entering the pipeline
on the questionable grounds that an employee's factual allegations do not demon-
strate plausible discrimination. In comparison, arbitration is starting not to look so
bad.
99. See, e.g., Gary L. Brase & Rebecca L. Miller, Differences in the Perception of and Reasoning
About Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment, PSYCHOL., EVOLUTION & GENDER 3.3, at 241-64 (Dec.
2001), available at http://www.k-state.edu/psych/research/documents/2001PEGOO1.pdf (last visited
Apr. 5, 2009) (demonstrating that women are more likely than men to perceive quid pro quo sexual
harassment as a threat than a social exchange).
100. See Scott Dodson, Pleading Standards After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 93 VA. L. REV. IN
BRIEF 135, 141-42 (July 9, 2007). Moreover, judges may have different views based on the political
party affiliation of the President who appointed him or her. See John Friedl & Andre Honoree, Essay,
Is Justice Blind? Examining the Relationship Between Presidential Appointments of Judges and Out-
comes in Employment Discrimination Cases, 38 CuMB. L. REV. 89 (2007) (noting statistically signifi-
cant effect of political party of President who appointed judge on judicial opinions regarding Title VII
summary judgment motions).
101. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are to be applied uniformly despite the underlying substan-
tive claim.
102. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558-59. Courts, commentators and scholars are wrestling with Twom-
bly's scope and impact, trying to discern if its reach goes beyond large, discovery-intensive cases such
as the antitrust class action at issue in Twombly itself. See e.g., Dodson, supra note 100, at 141-42;
Spencer, supra note 82, at 457-60 (arguing that Federal Rules are transsubstantive and therefore,
Twombly applies to all civil actions in the federal courts).
103. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559.
104. Id.
105. See Dodson, supra note 100, at 140-41.
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B. Trial
Even if an employee's claim of discrimination survives dismissal on its face,
the employee still has the formidable task of succeeding on the merits at trial. The
rate of success for employment discrimination claims in the federal district courts,
however, is slim. A recent study conducted by Professor Kevin M. Clermont and
Dean Stewart J. Schwab, analyzing federal civil cases from 1970 to 2006,1'6 paints
a bleak picture of how employees challenging workplace discrimination fare in
the federal courts today. 10 7 At the outset, "employment discrimination plaintiffs
constitute one of the least successful plaintiff classes at the district court level, in
that they win a very small percentage of their actions and fare worse than almost
any other category of civil case."' 0' From 1979-2006, the plaintiff success rate for
employment discrimination cases in federal court was fifteen percent, while the
plaintiff success rate for other types of federal cases was fifty-one percent.' 09
Moreover, plaintiffs challenging workplace discrimination have fewer oppor-
tunities to resolve their disputes short of trial. 110 While employment discrimina-
tion cases settle about seventy percent of the time, their trial rate is higher than
that of other cases."t ' Employment discrimination cases also proceed through the
litigation process longer; thirty-seven percent of them are resolved early in the
process, in comparison to fifty-nine percent for other types of cases.' 12  This
means that employees who bring claims in federal court may be in it for the long
haul. The cost, time, and burdens of civil litigation for employees are significant,
and the outcomes are increasingly unsuccessful.
106. See Empirical Study, supra note 2, at 4. The data was collected by the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts and assembled by the Federal Judicial Center, and disseminated by the Inter-
university Consortium for Political and Social Research. Id. "[T]he computerized database, compiled
from this information, contains all of the millions of federal civil cases over many years from the
whole country." Id. This recent study includes five additional years of data from a prior study con-
ducted by the same authors, in which they also concluded employees did not do well in federal court.
Id. at I ("Five years ago we surveyed how employment discrimination plaintiffs fared in federal court.
We wrote in summary that they have a tough row to hoe"). See Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J.
Schwab, How Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, I J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUDs. 429 (2004), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=557851; Kevin M.
Clermont et al., How Employment-Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 7
EMP. RTs. & EMP. POL'Y J. 547 (2003).
107. See also Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination Cases Fare in the Federal Courts:
An Empirical Analysis, Oct. 1, 2007, report for Mehri & Skalet, PLLC, available at
http://www.hlpronline.comIVol3.I/Clermont-Schwab_HLPR.pdf (last visited Apr. 12, 2009) (describ-
ing similar results).
108. Empirical Study, supra note 2, at 13.
109. Id. at 30, 32. Note, however, that plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases, unlike plaintiffs
in other cases, do substantially worse in judge trials than jury trials. Id. at 34. There is little difference
between the win rates injury trials for employment discrimination and other types of cases. Id.
110. Id. at 22 ("The data ... show that employment discrimination plaintiffs manage fewer resolu-
tions early in litigation compared to other plaintiffs, and so they have to proceed toward trial more
often"). The authors attribute this to defendants being more resistant to settling employment claims
because they know their chances at prevailing in court are good. Id.
I11. Id. at 22, 23.
112. Id. at 23.
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C. Appeals
Finally, if an employment discrimination case is appealed by either party, the
plaintiff is far more likely to lose. Empirical data shows "that the defendants'
reversal rate far exceeds the plaintiffs' reversal rate." 3 In other words, "the ap-
pellate courts reverse plaintiffs' wins below far more often than defendants' wins
below."' 14 Specifically, from 1988-2004, the percentage of appeals reversed after
plaintiffs' wins at trial was forty-one percent, while those after defendants' wins at
trial was less than nine percent. 1 5 During that same time period, the percentage
of appeals reversed after plaintiffs' wins at a pretrial adjudication was thirty per-
cent, while those after defendants' wins at a pretrial adjudication was eleven per-
cent.1 6 In sum, plaintiffs usually lose employment cases at the trial court level, a
result likely not to change on appeal. 17 Clermont and Schwab have identified an
"anti-plaintiff effect" that they attribute to negative judicial attitudes toward em-
ployment cases:" 1
8
For a plaintiff victorious at trial in an employment discrimination case,
the appellate process offers a chance of retaining victory that cannot
meaningfully be distinguished from a coin flip. Meanwhile, a defendant
victorious at trial can be assured of retaining that victory after appeal.
Defendants, in sharp contrast to plaintiffs, emerge from appellate court in
a much better position than they were in when they left trial court. In this
surprising plaintiff/defendant difference in the federal courts of appeals,
we have unearthed an anti-plaintiff effect that is troublesome. ... The an-
ti-plaintiff effect on appeal raises the specter that federal appellate courts
have a double standard for employment discrimination cases, harshly
scrutinizing employees' victories below while gazing benignly at em-
ployers' victories. 119
The skewed negative outcome for workplace discrimination cases begs the
question of why they fare so poorly. An immediate explanation that comes to
mind is that perhaps such cases are disproportionately weaker than others. Per-
haps these are frivolous lawsuits being appropriately weeded out through the judi-
cial system's checks and balances. This potential explanation is belied by several
observations.
First, the vast majority of employment discrimination cases that come up on
appeal involve claims of intentional discrimination--which require credibility
determinations usually subject to greater deferential review. 120 Given this fact,
one would expect the reversal rate for such cases to be lower rather than higher.
121




117. Id. at 6.
118. Id. at 8-16; see also id. at 13 ("We have argued elsewhere that an attitudinal explanation of the
anti-plaintiff effect is most persuasive") (citing studies).
119. Id. at 13, 15-16.
120. Id. at 13.
121. Id. at 13, n.34.
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Second, there is no reason to believe that plaintiffs' employment attorneys-who
labor under the same economic pressures to succeed under contingency fee
agreements--are more inclined to bring frivolous cases than other plaintiffs' at-
torneys. 12 2 Employment lawyers can no more afford to bring frivolous litigation
or be less selective than anyone else. This suggests that employment cases com-
ing into the pipeline are as rigorously selected as other types of cases. Third,
those cases that survive the gauntlet of procedural hurdles-motion to dismiss,
summary judgment, and trial--and do not settle are non-frivolous, close matters
that one would expect could go either way: reversal or affirmance.12 3 In light of
this backdrop, an "anti-plaintiff' attitude 24 is a plausible explanation for the
alarming reversal rate plaintiffs experience in workplace discrimination cases.
25
D. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Finally, employees may not be afforded the opportunity to avoid such litiga-
tion hurdles by early investigation and conciliation of their employment discrimi-
nation claims. The EEOC--the administrative agency tasked with such early
intervention-has been underfunded and overburdened for over a decade. As
discussed more fully at Part IV.B.3.b infra, this "resource starved" institution's
ability to effectively address workplace disputes prior to civil filing has been se-
verely compromised. 
126
122. Id. at n.34.
123. Id. at n. 34.
124. Id. at 13-14.
125. Empirical studies comparing the outcomes between arbitration and the court system for em-
ployees are rare and present mixed results. See Stermlight, In Defense of Mandatory Binding Arbitra-
tion (If Imposed on the Company), supra note 8, at 88 & n.30, n.3 1; Peter B. Rutledge, Whither Arbi-
tration? 6 GEo. J. OF L. & PUB. POL'Y 549, 556-60 (2008) (citing various empirical studies); Richard
Bales, Normative Consideration of Employment Arbitration at Gilmer's Quinceahiera, 81 TUL. L. REv.
331, 342 (2006) ("The early debate over employment occurred in a vacuum, with both proponents and
critics making policy arguments without empirical support"); Lewis L. Maltby, Employment Arbitra-
tion and Workplace Justice, 38 U.S.F. L. REv. 105 (2003) (summarizing empirical studies); Stemlight,
Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, supra note 8, at 1658-61; Samuel Estreicher, Michael
Heise & David Sherwyn, Assessing the Case for Employment Arbitration: A New Path for Empirical
Research, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1564-66 (2005) (discussing difficulty in making empirical compari-
sons between arbitration and litigation). See, e.g., The National Workrights Institute, Employment
Arbitration; What Does the Data Show, available at
http://www.workrights.org/current/cdarbitration.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2009); Christopher R.
Drahozal, Symposium, Arbitration Costs and Forum Accessibility: Empirical Evidence, 41 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 813 (2008); Megacases, supra note 11, at 43 ("employees win in arbitration slightly more
than half the time") (citing Michael Delikat & Morris M. Kleiner, Comparing Litigation and Arbitra-
tion of Employment Disputes: Do Plaintiffs Better Vindicate Their Rights in Litigation?, 6 ABA
LITIGATION SECTION CONFLICT MANAGEMENT (Winter 2003), available at
http://www.adrforum.conmrcontrol/documents/ResearchStudiesAndStatistics/2004EmpiricalStudies.pd
f, at 5 (last visited Apr. 5, 2009)); Michael H. LeRoy, Getting Nothing for Something: When Women
Prevail in Employment Arbitration Awards, 16 STAN. L. & POL'y REV. 573, 589 (2005); William M.
Howard, Arbitrating Claims of Employment Discrimination: What Really Does Happen? What Really
Should Happen?, 1995 J. DISP. RESOL. 40 (comparing employment litigation and arbitration out-
comes). Cf Caroline E. Mayer, Win Some, Lose Rarely?: Arbitration Forum's Rulings Called One-
Sided, WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 2000, at El. Given the confidentiality of many arbitration agreements,
obtaining such data is difficult.
126. Steve Vogel, EEOC Struggles With Huge Workload, Diminished Staff, WASH. POST, Feb. 2,
2009.
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Given the troubling federal judicial landscape, the time may be ripe to con-
sider an alternative. That alternative, however, should not be mandatory pre-
dispute arbitration. Obviously, neither compulsory pre-dispute arbitration, nor the
federal forum, is a perfect system. Therefore, it behooves employees and employ-
ers to consider another dispute resolution process. One-way binding arbitration,
which was first adopted by Texaco, 127 and subsequently implemented by Coke,
offers employees involved in workplace disputes the benefits of arbitration with-
out some of the baggage.
IV. ONE-WAY BINDING ARBITRATION AS A BETTER ALTERNATIVE
A. Coke's Solutions Program
1. Background of the Coke Employment Discrimination Settlement
On April 23, 1999, four named plaintiffs, representing a class of 2,200 current
and former salaried, African-American employees of the Coca-Cola Company,
filed a class action in the Northern District of Georgia against their employer.
128
The case was one of the largest employment race discrimination cases in United
States history at the time. 29 The plaintiffs alleged race discrimination in salaries,
promotions, and performance evaluations. 130  More specifically, the plaintiffs
alleged significant pay disparities between African-American and white em-
ployees,' 3 ' "glass ceilings" that kept African-Americans from holding upper
127. The Coke settlement was modeled after the settlement with Texaco, which provided $176 mil-
lion and extensive programmatic relief. At the time, Texaco was the largest employment discrmina-
tion settlement in U.S. history. Texaco's settlement was surpassed in monetary and programmatic
relief by the Coke settlement. See Sarah Schafer, Coke to Pay $193 Million in Bias Suit; Black Em-
ployees Sought Damages, WASH. POST, Nov. 17, 2000, at Al (Plaintiffs' attorney Pamela Coukos
describing the Coke settlement as a "sister settlement" to Texaco, but one with more power); Interview
with Cyrus Mehri, Corporate Crime Reporter, Nov. 27, 2000 (Plaintiffs' attorney Cyrus Mehri says,
"What we got from Texaco on the programmatic side was considered unprecedented - and we were
told it would never happen again. In Coca-Cola, we got Texaco plus").
Following Texaco's settlement, the company created a Solutions program which encompassed one-
way binding arbitration. See Texaco Solutions Brochure (provided by Joseph P. Moan, Coca-Cola
Senior Management Counsel, Employment Law) (on file with author) [hereinafter Texaco Solutions
Brochure] at 3, 11. The Solutions program was created by Texaco, but fell under the review of an
independent Equality and Tolerance Task Force. See Roberts v. Texaco, Inc., Stipulation and Settle-
ment Agreement, 94-Civ. 2015, 11, 13-14 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 1997) (on file with author). The settle-
ment agreement did not require the company to create Solutions, or to provide one-way binding arbi-
tration. In terms of problem resolution, the settlement only required Texaco to "[d]evelop and imple-
ment an ombudsperson program" and to "[d]evelop recommendations for the creation and implementa-
tion of a mechanism to minimize fear of retaliation in connection with complaints of employment
discrimination." Id. at 11-12.
128. See Ingram v. The Coca-Cola Co., 200 F.R.D. 685, 687, 697 (N.D. Ga. 2001).
129. Sakina Spruell, A Company in Recovery: Coca-Cola from Discrimination Suit to Diversity
Leader, DIVERSrrYINC Jan./Feb. 2007, 20,21.
130. Ingram, 200 F.R.D. at 687.
131. Nikhil Deogun, A race-bias suit tests Coke: Can the Real Thing do the right thing?, WALL ST.
J., May 18, 1999, at B1.
132. Laura Pearlman, Motisola Malikha Abdallah, et al. v. The Coca Cola Company; Keeping Tabs
on Coca-Cola, AM. LAW., July 1999, at 38.
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management-level positions, and "glass walls"'133 that kept African-Americans
from certain fields within management. Moreover, plaintiffs contended that the
company had been put on notice of these problems since 1995, but failed to act.
134
A number of significant developments ensued which ultimately led the parties
to settle. 135 On January 25, 2000, the court ordered the parties into non-binding
mediation. 136 On June 14, 2000, the parties reached a tentative settlement, 137 and
133. Daniela Deane, 'Bus Ride for Justice' Targets Coke; Black Employees Say They Are Denied
Raises, Promotions, WASH. POST, Apr. 18, 2000, at El; Henry Unger, Discrimination Lawsuit; Coca-
Cola Accused of 'Companywide Pattern,' ATLANTA J.-CONST., Apr. 24, 1999, at HI.
134. Ingram, 200 F.R.D. at 701. Senior Vice-President, Carl Ware, the highest ranking African-
American in the company at the time, wrote an internal report to Coke's CEO, Douglas Ivester, re-
commending diversity initiatives and raising disparities between African-Americans and whites in the
company. See Nikhil Deogun, Coke was told in '95 of need for diversity, WALL ST. J., May 20, 1999,
at A3; Henry Unger, Confidential Coke documents released, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Feb. 10, 2000, at El
(providing a description and excerpt of the Ware Report).
135. On June 4, 1999, the court ordered the company to turn over its workforce database and docu-
ments. See Bill Rankin, Coke ordered to surrender database, ATLANTA J.-CONST., June 9, 1999, at
D3. In July, the plaintiffs survived a dismissal of the class action claims. See Henry Unger, Class-
action part of Coca-Cola suit is not dismissed, ATLANTA J.-CONST., July 16, 1999, at Ft. In October
1999, plaintiffs' counsel accused the company of document destruction. See Henry Unger, Coca-Cola
denies it shredded documents, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Oct. 1, 1999, at El; Constance L. Hays, Coca-
Cola reaches a settlement with some workers in bias suit, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2000, at Cl (discuss-
ing document destruction accusations).
Months later, CEO Ivester demoted Ware, the highest ranking African-American, prompting Ware's
resignation. Ivester announced his own retirement following a board meeting and Ware delayed his
retirement. Douglas Daft became the new CEO. See Randall L. Walter & Nicola Graves, The Corpo-
rate Web Site as an Image Restoration Tool: The Case of Coca-Cola, published in PROCEEDINGS OF
THE 2004 ASSOCIATION FOR BUSINESS COMMUNICATION ANNUAL CONVENTION 37, App. at 53 (Jea-
nette S. Martin ed., 2004); Ann Harrington, Prevention is the Best Defense; Coke Dithered, Blundered,
then Settled. Now, at Last, It's Trying to Change Its Culture, FORTUNE, July 10, 2000, at 188.
In 2000, African-American workers started mobilizing and organizing around the case - meeting,
rallying, and preparing for a nationwide boycott of Coke products. See Henry Unger, Coke employees
begin to mobilize, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Feb. 29, 2000, at Cl; Henry Unger, Coke changes waiver
stance, laid-off workers can receive enhanced benefits and participate in race bias suit, ATLANTA J.-
CONST., Mar. 4, 2000, at Fl; Shelia M. Pool, Laid-off Coke workers rally for fair treatment, ATLANTA
J.-CONST., Mar. 5, 2000, at F2; Henry Unger, Coke signals a desire to settle lawsuit, ATLANTA J.-
CONST., Mar. 8, 2000, at Fl; Constance L. Hays, Coke's black employees step up pressure to resolve a
racial discrimination lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2000, at Cl; Constance L. Hays, Group of black
employees calls for boycott of Coca-Cola products, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2000, at Cl. These forces
came to a head, leading the parties to settle:
In early 2000, public pressure for a settlement mounted, A former Coca-Cola manager, Larry
[Jones], took thirty Coca-Cola employees with him on a bus ride from Atlanta, Georgia, to the
shareholders' meeting in Wilmington, Delaware, to threaten a boycott of Coca-Cola products un-
less Coca-Cola addressed its record on diversity and fair treatment. The Reverend Jesse Jackson
also spoke to the audience at the shareholders' meeting to pressure Coca-Cola to settle. Less than
two months after this meeting, the plaintiffs and Coca-Cola reached an agreement to settle in
principle and then spent four more months hammering out the details of the settlement, which
was announced in November of 2000.
Megacases, supra note 11, at 400-401.
136. See Henry Unger, Coke Suit Mediation Ordered, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Feb. 9, 2000, at D 1.
137. Ingram, 200 F.R.D. at 687. See Constance L. Hays, Coca-Cola reaches a settlement with some
workers in bias suit, N.Y. TMES, June 15, 2000, at Cl; Henry Unger, Coke talks were 'intense,' me-
diator says; Skilled Diplomacy: Veteran intermediary Hunter Hughes calls it the most difficult case
he's had, ATLANTA J.-CONST., June 18, 2000, at GI (describing dramatic moment where plaintiffs'
attorneys called their paralegals minutes before deadline to stop them from filing class certification
brief with 30 boxes of documents because of settlement reached); Interview with Cyrus Mehri, supra
note 127 (describing same).
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on November 16, 2000, the parties announced the final settlement terms. 3 ' The
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia approved the settlement
agreement on June 7, 2001.139 The settlement provided $192.5 million---the larg-
est monetary settlement in a race discrimination case in the country at that
time-and extensive programmatic relief that linked diversity to business goals
and bonuses. 14° The settlement covered various human resources practices and
procedures, organized into nine systems. 14 1 The extensive programmatic relief
and oversight led the judge, mediator, and parties to praise it as an historic and
groundbreaking result.142 The work of the independent Task Force that supervised
the settlement, described infra, impacted all of the roughly 7,000143 non-hourly
138. Abdallah v. The Coca-Cola Co., No. 1-98-CV-3679 (RWS), The Class Representatives' Motion
for Approval of Settlement and Brief in Support, 2001 WL 36041527 (N.D. Ga. May 22, 2001).
Henry Unger, Coke agrees to employment review, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Nov. 16, 2000, at Al. The
court preliminarily approved of the settlement agreement on Dec. 22, 2000. See Abdallah v. The Coca-
Cola Co., No. 1-98-CV-3679 (RWS), The Class Representatives' Motion for Approval of Settlement
and Brief in Support, 2001 WL 36041527 (N.D. Ga. May 22, 2001); Russell Grantham, Coca-Cola
employees get lawsuit deadline, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Dec. 23, 2000, at Fl (describing preliminary
approval).
139. Ingram, 200 F.R.D. at 702. See Judge to Approve Coke Settlement, AP ONLINE, May 30, 2001;
Henry Unger, Judge OKs Coke bias settlement; $192.5 million deal sets new diversity goals, ATLANTA
J.-CONST., May 30, 2001, at Al.
140. See Coke Fifth Task Force Report, supra note 1, at 5, 70 (Coke committed to a corporate "cul-
ture by designing and implementing a comprehensive strategy that links diversity to business goals and
makes diversity a business imperative"); Megacases, supra note 11, at 403, n. 245 ("In 2007, the
company stated that twenty percent of management bonuses are tied to diversity results") (citing
DIVERSiTYINC, Top 50 for Diversity Profiles, No. 4: The Coca-Cola Company, available at
http://www.diversityinc.conpublic/1801.cfm).
141. These include: performance management, staffing, compensation, diversity education, EEO,
career development, succession planning, mentoring and problem resolution. Alexis M. Herman, et al.,
Ingram v. The Coca-Cola Co., No. 1-98-CV-3679 (N.D. Ga.) [hereinafter Coke First Task Force
Report], at 6.
142. In approving the settlement agreement, the court described Coke's commitment to the agreement
and its Statement of Principle as "historic," and noted that "the possibilities for change and for improv-
ing the lot of all employees at Coca-Cola are tremendous." Id. at 1 (quoting Transcript of May 29,
2001 Fairness Hearing, at 214). The mediator for the settlement, Hunter Hughes, echoed the court's
sentiment:
In my experience, the programmatic relief required by the Coke settlement is unique and
groundbreaking. It calls for an analysis and potential revamping of virtually all aspects of Coke's
personnel practices by independent professionals, with further direct oversight and input from a
separate independent task force.
Henry Unger, Coke agrees to employment review; details of settlement due today, ATLANTA J.-
CONST., Nov. 16, 2000, at Al. See James P. Miller, Bias case costs Coke record $192.5 Million;
'There's going to be fundamental change,' says former worker, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 17, 2000, at NI
(Plaintiffs' attorney, Cyrus Mehri, described it as "perhaps the largest and most sweeping settlement in
a race discrimination class-action in U.S. history"); Davan Maharaj, Coca-Cola to settle racial bias
lawsuit; Workplace: Soft drink giant agrees to pay $192.5 million over allegations it treated blacks
unfairly, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2000, at Al (Coke Chairman Douglas Daft described it as "meaningful,
constructive and equitable to all parties.... It will be a process that continues forever.").
143. Harry R. Weber, Judge encourages Coke to keep new diversity, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 2,
2006. The Task Force's First Annual Report identified 6,864 employees covered by the consent decree
(Coca-Cola Company's non-hourly U.S. workforce). Coke First Task Force Report, supra note 141, at
11; see also Coke Fifth Task Force Report, supra note 1, at 13. By the time the Task Force published
its fifth and final report, that number had gone down 5 percent to a total of 6,557 employees as of Sept.
30, 2006. Id. at 13. The Task Force's final report, issued on Dec. 1, 2006, described the workforce
demographics as follows:
No. 1]
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
employees of the Coca-Cola Company based in the United States from April 22,
1995, to June 14, 2000.144
2. The Task Force
In addition to the extensive programmatic relief, the agreement established an
external seven-member Task Force that provided independent oversight of Coke's
compliance with the agreement over a four-year period. 14 5 At the request of Coke
in December 2004, the Task Force went on to serve an additional year.' 46 The
Task Force enjoyed extensive power to ensure compliance. 147 Specifically:
The Task Force [was] empowered to evaluate the Company's human re-
sources policies and practices, recommend any necessary improvements
to those policies and practices, monitor Coca-Cola's practices for the du-
ration of the Agreement, investigate complaints, and provide periodic
written reports on the Company's progress toward the terms of the
Agreement. 148
The Task Force was comprised of three members chosen by each party, and
the chairperson, former Secretary of Labor, Alexis M. Herman, whom both parties
selected. 49 The Task Force, approved of by the court, consisted of top leaders in
diverse fields,' 50 and was guided by court-appointed human resources experts, Dr.
[S]ince our 2005 report, the workforce has remained roughly half female and a third minority,
with approximately two-thirds of the minority workforce being African-American. However,
over the entire course of the Settlement Agreement, the relative percentage of minorities in the
workforce has increased by a fifth, from approximately 29% in December 2000 to 35% as of
September 2006. Over half of the gain in minority representation was made by African Ameri-
cans.
Coke Fifth Task Force Report, supra note 1, at 13, T.1. While all of the roughly 7,000 non-unionized
employees were the beneficiaries of the broad programmatic relief, only class members were eligible
for monetary relief. Out of a class of 2,201 members, the overwhelming majority, 2,191, received
monetary relief. See id. at 59.
144. Employees covered by the Agreement work for one of the three major business units of the
Coca-Cola Company: Corporate, Coca-Cola North America ("CCNA"), and The Minute Maid Com-
pany ("TMMC"), Coke First Task Force Report, supra note 141, at 1.
145. See Henry Unger, Judge instructs Coke Task Force, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Aug. 22, 2001, at D3
(Judge Richard Story explained to Task Force, "You do not represent the Coca-Cola Co. You do not
represent any Coca-Cola employee. You represent the court." He further informed the Task Force that
their recommendations "shall be implemented, unless I rule otherwise").
146. Coke Fifth Task Force Report, supra note 1, at 2; Alexis M. Herman, et al., Ingram v. The Coca-
Cola Co., No. 1-98-CV-3679 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 1, 2005) [hereinafter Coke Fourth Task Force Report], at
3.
147. The recommendations of the Task Force were binding on the company, unless Coke sought
judicial relief. See Ingram v. The Coca-Cola Co., 200 F.R.D. 685, 688 (N.D. Ga. 2001).
148. Coke First Task Force Report, supra note 141, at 1.
149. See Jonathan D. Glater & Greg Winter, Coca-Cola selects former Labor Secretary to lead diver-
sity task force, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2001, at C1; Henry Unger, Ex-Labor Chief to head Coke diversity
panel, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Mar. 15, 2001, at Al.
150. At the time the Task Force was created, it was comprised of:
" M. Anthony Bums: Chairman of Ryder System, Inc., member of Board of Directors of Chase
Manhattan
* Gilbert F. Casellas: President and CEO of Q-LINX Inc., former chair of the EEOC
* Edmund D. Cooke, Jr.: partner at Winston & Strawn law firm, labor and employment lawyer
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Irwin Goldstein' 5' and Dr. Kathleen Lundquist, 152 who identified "best practic-
es' ' 153 and guided the company in its commitment to go beyond this to achieve the
"Gold Standard" in human resources.'1
4
The Task Force relied on various sources of qualitative and quantitative in-
formation in its analysis of Coke's compliance with the settlement agreement and
the efficacy of its human resources systems. Specifically, Coke used an employee
engagement survey to assess how employees felt about the systems put in place.'
55
The company's May 2002 employee enga ement survey was the baseline to
which every subsequent year was compared. 6
For the first year, the Task Force "focused principally on ensuring that the
Company designed the best human resources systems possible for Coca-Cola
employees."'157 The Task Force's first annual report, covering July 2001 through
June 30, 2002, set forth the design of the nine human resources processes, and
baseline data, from which subsequent comparisons could be made. 58 In the
* Marjorie Fine Knowles: law professor, Georgia State University Law School
* Bill Lann Lee: former Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights at the Justice Department,
former Western Regional Counsel for the NAACP Legal Defense Fund
* Ren6 A. Redwood, former Special Assistant to Secretary of Labor Robert Reich, Executive
Director of the Presidential Glass Ceiling Commission
See Henry Unger, Coke completes diversity task force, ATLANTA J.-CONST., July 3, 2001, at D3; Me-
gacases, supra note 11, at 401.
151. At the time, Dr. Irwin Goldstein, an industrial psychologist, was the Dean of the College of
Behavioral Sciences at the University of Maryland. Coke First Task Force Report, supra note 141, at 5.
Prior to his becoming dean, he served as an assistant professor at Ohio State University and then pro-
fessor at the University of Maryland, College Park. He received, among other awards, the University
of Maryland President's Medal for "extraordinary contributions to the intellectual, cultural and social
life of the University." See Universities at Shady Grove Board of Advisors Biography for Dr. Irwin
Goldstein, Senior Vice Chancellor of Academic Affairs, University System of Maryland,
http://www.shadygrove.umd.edu/leadership-commiteeslboa/member-list/bios/dr-irwin-goldstein.cfm
(last visited Apr. 5, 2009).
152. At the time, Dr. Kathleen K. Lundquist, an industrial psychologist, was a national expert in
human resources processes. Coke First Task Force Report, supra note 141, at 5. She is co-founder and
president of Applied Psychological Techniques, Inc., and recipient of the National Association of
Women Business Owners-CT 2002 Woman Business Owner of the Year Award. She has been consult-
ing Fortune 100 employers on the design and implementation of their H.R. processes for over twenty-
five years. See http://www.aptmetrics.compeople/management/klundquist.asp (last visited Apr. 5,
2009); http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/meetingsl5-16-O7/lundquist-bio.html (last visited Apr. 5,
2009).
153. Coke Fifth Task Force Report, supra note 1, at 2. While the term "best practices" has been
defined as "those technical, business, and management practices that have proven successful and are
used by a large number of companies in an industry," Michael D. Scott, Tort Liability for Vendors of
Insecure Software: Has the Time Finally Come? 67 MD. L. REV. 425, 446 (2008), its precise meaning
remains obscure. David Zaring, Best Practices, 81 N.Y.U. L. REv. 294, 307-308 (2006). More specifi-
cally:
Although agencies increasingly operate through best practices, the term has never been defined
with precision. Congress has not weighed in on its exact meaning. The Supreme Court has not
either, though it has heard cases that turned in part on the meaning of best practices. Nor does the
term have a standard definition in the business management context where it originated; nor do
agencies themselves, in most cases, define how to identify a best practice.
Id.
154. Coke Fifth Task Force Report, supra note 1, at 3, 7.
155. Coke First Task Force Report, supra note 141, at 7.
156. Id. at 7.
157. Id. at 8.
158. Id.
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second report (covering July 1, 2002, through September 30, 2003), third report
(covering October 1, 2003, through September 30, 2004), and fourth report (cov-
ering October 1, 2004, through September 30, 2005), the Task Force turned to
"monitoring the implementation and effectiveness of these systems to ensure that
they were working as designed and that progress was being made."' 5 9 In its fifth
and final report (covering October 1, 2005, through September 30, 2006), the Task
Force focused on the extent to which Coke institutionalized the principles of the
settlement agreement generally throughout the company, particularly within mid-
dle management and all aspects of human resources.16° In this final report, the
Task Force's assessments and recommendations emphasized how Coke's restruc-
tured personnel practices could be sustainable in the long run and ultimately be-
come embedded in the company's culture.'
6'
3. Coke's Problem Resolution System
Following the settlement, Coke developed an internal mechanism-which
could be initiated by the employee-for resolving workplace disputes. The set-
tlement agreement memorialized Coke's commitment not to retaliate against em-
ployees who challenged its employment practices,' 62 and to establish an internalcomplaint mechanism comprised of a toll-free hotline, 163 an Ombudsperson,164
159. Alexis M. Herman, et al., Ingram v. The Coca-Cola Co., No. 1-98-CV-3679 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 1,
2003) [hereinafter Coke Second Task Force Report], at 2-3; Alexis M. Herman et al., Ingram v. The
Coca-Cola Co., No. 1-98-CV-3679 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 1, 2004) [hereinafter Coke Third Task Force Re-
port], at 3; Coke Fourth Task Force Report, supra note 146, at 3 ("the Task Force continues its empha-
sis on effective implementation of programs and evaluates the Company's efforts toward sustainability
of these programs").
160. Coke Fifth Task Force Report, supra note 1, at 3.
161. Id. at4.
162. Abdallah v. The Coca-Cola Company, Settlement Agreement, No. 1-98-CV-3679 (N.D. Ga.
Nov. 20, 2000) [hereinafter Coke Settlement Agreement], at 6. Section t.C. "Non-Retaliation" states,
"Coca-Cola reaffirms its commitment and acknowledges its legal obligation not to retaliate against
persons participating in this lawsuit, asserting claims of unlawful discrimination against it or those who
assist them in doing so."
163. Coke Settlement Agreement, supra note 162, at 22, Section II.D.7.i. "Ombuds Function" states:
Coca-Cola will establish a 1-800 phone number (operational 24 hours a day, 7 days a week) and
retain an independent entity or individual to receive complaints of discrimination, harassment,
and/or retaliation. This independent entity or individual will refer all reports or complaints to an
internal Ombudsperson ....
164. Coke Settlement Agreement, supra note 162, at 22-23, Section II.D.7.i. "Ombuds Function" sets
forth the terms of the Ombudsperson's feature of the settlement:
[The] Ombudsperson [I will be responsible for: (1) ensuring that each report and complaint is ap-
propriately investigated; (2) monitoring the investigations, and (3) reporting the results of each
investigation to the appropriate management officials. Coca-Cola will promptly select a candi-
date for the Ombudsperson position and notify Settlement Class Counsel who may, within 5
business days, comment on the candidate's qualifications. The final decision as to who fills the
position will be made by Coca-Cola. The Ombudsperson will be (or become) a Coca-Cola em-
ployee at not less than Salary Grade 12. Such person may be removed from his or her position by
the Company for:- (1) failure to achieve a MR [meets requirements] performance rating or higher
(or its future equivalent), (2) good cause, or (3) a Code of Business Conduct violation. Removal
may also be recommended by the Task Force. The Ombudsperson will report directly to the
CEO. The Ombudsperson will make periodic status reports to the Vice-President of Human Re-
sources and the Task Force, as well as an annual status report to the CEO and the Public Issues
and Diversity Review and Compensation Committees of the Board of Directors.
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and an independent Task Force. 165 The Task Force called this programmatic relief
Problem Resolution, one of the nine human resource systems' 66 addressed in the
consent decree. Problem Resolution-defined as "the methods for internally sur-
facing, investigating and resolving employee complaints"167---evolved over time,
as Coke continued to develop various methodologies for addressing complaints.
In each of its five yearly reports, the Task Force described the status of Problem
Resolution's design, implementation, and monitoring.
Coke called its first attempt at designing and implementing a Problem Reso-
lution program the Solutions program. Class counsel played no role in the crea-
tion of Solutions.168 Rather, Solutions was created entirely by the company, and
fell under the independent review of the Task Force.169 While some of the fea-
tures of the initial Solutions program were required by the settlement agreement
(such as the Ombudsperson and hotline described below), much of the program
went far beyond what was required. The Solutions program provided employees
with a "variety of approaches or vehicles by which to resolve problems" 70 and
was comprised of five components: 1) the Open Door process, 2) the Employee
Resolution Department; 3) an Ombuds Director, 4) the Employee Reporting Ser-
vice ("ERS") or hotline, and 5) the Employee Assistance Program ("EAP").
17 1
Coke designed this initial Solutions program' 72 to give employees an opportunity
to resolve disputes with managers in a timelier manner, with greater options,
without fear of retaliation, and with more management accountability. 17' The
Open Door process gave each non-unionized employee an opportunity to resolve
workplace issues directly with his or her manager, and if necessary, with manag-
ers one or two steps above.174 If that effort proved unsuccessful, an employee
could seek help from the Employee Resolution Department (in the Corporate Hu-
man Resources Department) with investigating and resolving the dispute. 175 The
Coke Settlement Agreement, supra note 162, at 22-23.
165. Coke Settlement Agreement, supra note 162, at 23, Section II.D.7.j. "EEO Compliance and
Response to Discrimination and Retaliation Complaints" states:
The Task Force, in conjunction with the Ombudsperson, shall ensure that all complaints of dis-
crimination and retaliation are fully and fairly investigated, according to appropriate written
guidelines, by adequately trained personnel, utilizing written record-keeping, and with written
dispositions reflecting appropriate remedies. The Task Force, in conjunction with the Ombuds-
person, shall ensure that Coca-Cola institutionalizes effective responses to discrimination com-
plaints, through its procedures, reporting and monitoring, and any necessary training programs.
.. The Task Force, in conjunction with the Ombudsperson, may evaluate whether implementing
an ADR procedure would improve reporting and response.
Coke Settlement Agreement, supra note 162, at 23 (emphasis added).
166. See Coke First Task Force Report, supra note 141, at 6.
167. Coke Fifth Task Force Report, supra note 1, at 9.
168. E-mail from Cyrus Mehri, plaintiffs counsel, Mehri & Skalet, PLLC, to Suzette M. Malveaux
(Apr. 6, 2009) (on file with author).
169. Id.
170. Coke First Task Force Report, supra note 141, at 31.
171. Id. at 31.
172. "The company designed the process after the settlement. The process was designed - after exten-
sive benchmarking and best practice research and in consultation with the Task Force and Joint Ex-
perts." E-mail from Joseph P. Moan, Coca-Cola Company Senior Management Counsel, Employment
Law to Suzette M. Malveaux (Mar. 5, 2009) (on file with author).
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employee also had at his disposal the Ombuds Office (a confidential, neutral party
available for consultation, who met monthly with the CEO) 176 and the ERS (an
independent, anonymous toll-free number that received complaints and forwarded
them to the Ombuds Office). 177 Lastly, the EAP served as a mechanism that pro-
vided professional counseling for employees. 1
78
While the Task Force concluded in its first annual report that "[t]he design,
planning and initial implementation" of the Problem Resolution System met the
Task Force's expectations under the settlement agreement, it conceded that com-
munication, monitoring, and evaluation would be critical to the program's suc-
cess. 179 Even though the Task Force initially found that "[d]ata from the em-
ployee engagement survey indicate that employees generally view these systems
positively"--with African-Americans and Hispanics viewing them more favora-
bly than whites- 8 0 -4t also noted that many employees might not even be aware of
the components in place. 81 At this juncture, the company had yet to implement
the mediation and arbitration components, although the possibility of their inclu-
sion was being explored.
182
Coke's Problem Resolution Program changed over the course of the settle-
ment compliance period. In July 2003, the company announced the hiring of a
Chief Ethics and Compliance Officer to head its Compliance Office, which began
developing the mediation and arbitration piece of Solutions.183 By spring of 2004,
Coke unveiled a new Solutions program that included mediation and arbitration
for the first time. 184 As of October 2005, Coke's reorganized program consisted
of three primary components: the revised Solutions Program, discussed below, an
Ombuds Office, and an Employee Reporting Service ("ERS")(or hotline). 185 Ac-
companying the new program was a "major communications effort" that empha-
sized both the various avenues by which an employee could raise workplace is-
sues and the importance of the Ombuds Office-a requirement of the settlement
agreement. 1
86
4. Coke's Revised Solutions Program
Coke created the new Solutions program to be one of the primary means by
which employees could register workplace concerns with the company and to




179. Id. at 32.
180. The terminology used to describe the racial classifications are those used by the Task Force in its
reports.
181. Id. ("[D]ata indicated that many employees might not be aware of the availability of these sys-
tems. That is somewhat understandable as many of these systems are new, but large numbers of em-
ployees were not aware even of the 'Open Door Process').
182. Id.
183. Coke Third Task Force Report, supra note 159, at 46.
184. Id. at 46, 47; Coke Fourth Task Force, supra note 146, at 44.
185. Coke Fifth Task Force Report, supra note 1, at 45-46.
186. Id. at46.
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employees.' 87 The program is based on the notion that internal, early, and open
communication is the best way to "maintain a positive, productive working envi-
ronment," and that only if the internal process fails should the parties seek help
from a neutral outside source.' 88  According to the company: "Participation in
Solutions does not preclude an employee from pursuing any available legal reme-
dy; Solutions is not intended either to restrict or expand the employee's or the
Company's legal rights."
18 9
The Solutions program is comprised of five steps that a non-unionized em-
ployee with a workplace dispute is required' 90 to utilize in the following order:' 91
1) Open Door, 2) Facilitation, 3) Written Appeal, 4) Mediation, and 5) Arbitra-
tion. 19 2 The first three steps are designed to internally resolve workplace problems
employees have with management, with the help of Human Resources, and a Pro-
gram Manager in the company's Diversity & Workplace Fairness Office.' 93 The
company's expectation is that the "vast majority of issues will be resolved satis-
factorily" here. 194 Because of the informal and cooperative nature of the first
three steps, neither party is permitted to have an attorney during these steps, un-
less required by law.
195
The Open Door policy is just that. Immediate managers have an open door
policy that enables employees to speak directly to their immediate managers or
their supervisors,' 96 about workplace issues. 97 The employee's Human Resources
187. Coke Rules, supra note 5, at 1.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 8. Moreover, the parties are not foreclosed from seeking emergency relief from the courts
until the issue is resolved through Solutions. Id. For example, a party may seek a temporary restraining
order or preliminary injunction prior to exhausting Solutions. Id.
190. See id. at 10, Section 12, "Consent," at 10 ("Employment or continued employment after the
Effective Date of Solutions constitutes consent by the employee to participate in Solutions, both during
the employment and after termination of employment").
191. Id. at 4-7.There are some exceptions to this. The seriousness of a workplace issue may justify the
expediting or skipping the Open Door process altogether and going directly to Facilitation or Written
Appeal for a formal investigation. Id. at 4. For example, harassment may require more immediate
action, regardless of the status of Open Door discussions. Id. The Diversity & Workplace Fairness
Office has the discretion to make these decisions. Id.
Concomitantly, the Diversity & Workplace Fairness Office Program Manager may delay the em-
ployee's moving from one step to the next if she deems it appropriate. Id. at 5.
The Program Manager may determine that further proceedings under the Open Door process
would be helpful to resolution of the dispute and ask for such further steps as a prerequisite to
Facilitation.... Facilitation will be deemed complete when either: 1) the issue is resolved, or 2)
the Program Manager has determined that Facilitation would no longer be useful.
Id.
The employee also has the obligation to move his or her issue expeditiously through the Solutions
process. See id. at 8 ("At the end of each step of Solutions, an employee who desires to move to the
next step must make the request within 30 days, unless there are extenuating circumstances that, in the
judgment of the Program Manager, justify an extension of this deadline").
Former employees raising legal disputes may proceed directly to the Mediation and Arbitration steps
of Solutions. Id. at 7.
192. Id. at 1.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 7.
195. id. at 9.
196. Where it is not feasible or appropriate to contact the immediate manager, the employee can, in
consultation with the Human Resources representative, negotiate instead with managers up to two
additional levels above. Id. at 4.
197. Id.
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representative is there to aid the dialogue, which should occur within forty-eight
hours of contact, and lead to a resolution after ten days.
98
In the event that the problem is not resolved through Open Door, the em-
ployee may proceed to Facilitation, where the employee openly discusses the issue
with the relevant manager(s), a Program Manager from the Diversity &
Workplace Fairness Office, and Human Resources representatives. 199 An investi-
gation may also take place. 200 The goal of the process is to be "informal and ex-
peditious. ' ' 2°
If the employee remains unsatisfied, he or she may proceed to step three and
file a Written Appeal to the Senior Management Panel. 2U Upon receiving a Writ-
ten Appeal, the Diversity & Workplace Fairness Office will hold a hearing within
sixty days to resolve the dispute. 203 The employee has the right to appear at the
204hearing and make a statement or answer questions. A manager also provides
the employee with a written explanation for the underlying employment decision
at issue.2 After the hearing, the Senior Management Panel makes the final, in-
ternal determination based on documentation provided through the prior steps, the
results of investigations, and any additional information. The panel issues a
written decision to the employee, with an explanation for the decision and for any
relief provided.207
Once the first three internal steps are exhausted,20 8 if the dispute is a "legal"
one 29-as defined by the company---then the employee must proceed to media-
tion and, perhaps, arbitration.2 ° Both mediation and arbitration involve an out-
side neutral party.2 t '
198. Id.
199. Id. at 5.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 4-6. The Senior Management Panel is comprised of the General Counsel or designated
representative, the Senior Vice President of Human Resources or designated representative, and the






208. Id. at 7.
209. The Program Manager of the Diversity & Workplace Fairness Office has the sole discretion to
determine if a matter is a qualifying "Legal Dispute" and therefore eligible for Mediation and Arbitra-
tion. Id. at 11, 14. According to the Coke Rules:
Legal Disputes... are disputes involving legally protected rights, whether in contract, tort, under
statute or regulation, or some other law. Legal Disputes can include, but are not limited to:
" claims of discrimination, including, for example, claims based on race, sex, religion,
national origin, age, or disability
* claims of harassment, including sexual harassment
" claims for wages or other compensation
" claims of breach of contract
" claims of damage to person or property
Id. at3.
210. Legal claims barred by the applicable statutes of limitations may be precluded by the Program
Manager from proceeding to Mediation and Arbitration, and the company can use the statute of limita-
tions as a defense. However, if an employee enters Solutions with a timely legal claim, the claim does
not expire while the employee is going through Solutions. The statute of limitations is tolled while the
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Mediation involves the parties working with a mediator to find common
ground.21 2 The parties first collectively select the mediator from a Roster of Neu-
trals.213 Coke pays the fees and costs of the mediator, while each party covers the
costs to prepare his or her own case. 214 Each party is permitted to bring counsel,
at the party's expense, but Coke will not bring counsel in the event the employee
does not.215 The mediation is private, confidential, and not reduced to writing.216
Either party or the mediator can terminate the mediation if desired.217
5. Coke's Arbitration Provision
The final step of Solutions is arbitration. Once mediation has been exhausted,
218an employee must proceed to arbitration to resolve the dispute. To utilize this
step, the employee submits a Request for Arbitration no more than thirty days
after the completion of mediation, at which time the Solutions Program Manager
219determines, at his sole discretion, whether arbitration is appropriate. Coke's
arbitration process is covered by the National Rules for the Resolution of Em-
ployment Disputes of the American Arbitration Association ("AAA"), subject to
Coke's own rules described in the Coca-Cola Company Solutions Program
Rules.220 Coke pays the fees and costs of the arbitrator and the AAA.22' Each
party is permitted to bring counsel, at the party's expense, and Coke "may have an
attorney present at all Arbitrations. 222
employee exhausts the Solutions internal process. Id. at 8; see also Telephone Interview with Joseph P.
Moan (Feb. 16, 2009) (on file with author).
211. Coke Rules, supra note 5, at 8.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 11-12. Solutions provides a method for ensuring that each party has input into the selection
of the mediator, although if the parties cannot come to agreement the Program Manager will select the
mediator:
Within five days after determination to proceed with Mediation, each Party will be sent the list of
geographically available mediators from the Roster of Neutrals. Each Party will then have ten
days from the transmittal date to strike one mediator from the list and to number the remaining
names in order of preference.., and return the list to the Program Manager. The selected media-
tor shall be the individual with the lowest combined score. In the event of a tie, the Program
Manager may select either of the tied mediators to serve. If a Party does not return the list within
ten days, all persons therein will be deemed acceptable. The Program Manager will invite the se-
lected mediator to accept and serve.
Id. at 11. The Coke Rules also describe the qualification of the mediator, excluding those presumptive-
ly or actually biased. Id. at 11-12.
214. Id. at 14.
215. Id. at 9, 12.
216. Id. at 13.
217. Id. at 14. Coke's mediation process is governed by the Mediation Rules and Standards of Con-
duct applicable to the state in which the mediation occurs, id. at 11, and by the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service ("FMCS"). Feb. 16, 2009, telephone Interview with Moan, supra note 210.
218. Id. In the event that the Program Manager determines that arbitration would not be fruitful, the
employee has exhausted Solutions and may pursue civil litigation.
219. Id. at 14.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 22.
222. Id. at 9.
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The parties collectively select an arbitrator from a list of qualified arbitrators
223supplied by the AAA. Coke has an opportunity to present defenses and bring
counterclaims in response to the employee's Request for Arbitration, and the em-
ployee may defend against such counterclaims. 224 Both parties may amend their
claims. 225 At the direction of the arbitrator, the parties are required to exchange
witness lists.226 Discovery includes reasonable document requests, depositions of
the employee and of appropriate Coke emvloyees, twenty-five interrogatories per
side, and disclosure of expert testimony.22  The arbitrator may permit additional
depositions and discovery, sua sponte, or upon a showing of good cause, and he or
she may issue subpoenas for non-party depositions. 228 Each party must bear its
own discovery costs, including costs for duplication and expert services.
229
At the request of the AAA, the parties, or the arbitrator, a conference may be
held to discuss and decide any matters that will expedite arbitration, and this con-
ference may be held by phone, written submission, or in person. 23  The arbitration
is private and confidential.23 1 The arbitrator may issue summary judgment.232
223. Id. at 15. Solutions provides a method for ensuring that each party has input into the selection of
the arbitrator, although if the parties cannot come to agreement the AAA will select the arbitrator:
Upon receipt of the Request for Arbitration, AAA immediately will send each Party an identical
list of names of persons chosen from a panel of qualified arbitrators that AAA will select and
maintain. Each Party will then have ten days from the transmittal date to strike any arbitrator ob-
jected to, number the remaining names in order of preference ... and return the list to AAA and
the Program Manager. If a Party does not retum the list within ten days, all persons therein will
be deemed acceptable. From among the persons who have been approved on both lists, and in
accordance with the order of mutual preference, AAA will invite an arbitrator to accept and
serve.
Any Party will have the right to strike one list of arbitrators in its entirety. When a Party exercises
the right, AAA will issue a new list of arbitrators to all Parties consistent with the above proce-
dures.
If the lists the Parties return to AAA do not contain at least one arbitrator approved by both Par-
ties, AAA will have the authority to appoint an arbitrator from among other members of the panel
without the submission of additional lists to the Parties.
Coke Rules, supra note 5, at 15. The Coke Rules also describe the qualification of the arbitrator, ex-
cluding those presumptively or actually biased. Id.; see also AAA National Rules for Resolution of
Employment Disputes, effective July 1, 2006, Employment Arbitration Rules and Mediation Proce-
dures §§ 12, 13, 15, 16, available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=32904 (last visited Apr. 5, 2009).
A procedure that gives the employee input into selection of the arbitrator is critical to avoiding the risk
that "repeat players" (employers who make repeated use of the process) will be favored by the process.
For a discussion of this phenomenon and the impact of the AAA's Due Process Protocols on this risk,
see Lisa Bingham & Shimon Sarraf, Employment Arbitration Before and After the Due Process Proto-
col for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising Out of Employment: Preliminary
Evidence that Self-Regulation Makes a Difference, in ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE
EMPLOYMENT ARENA: PROCEEDINGS OF THE NYU 53RD ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 303, 325
(Estreicher & Sherwyn eds. 2004).
224. Coke Rules, supra note 5, at 16.
225. Id,
226. Id. at 16.
227. Id. at 16-17.
228. Id. at 17.
229. Id. at 22.
230. Id. at 17, 18.
231. Id. at21.
232. Id. at 18.
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Coke's arbitration process provides all of the substantive rights and remedies
that would be available in court.23 3 The employee is permitted to take paid2 34 time
off from work to participate in arbitration.
The arbitrator ultimately conducts a hearing, at which time the parties must
have a "full and fair opportunity to present their evidence and arguments,"
236
whether by phone, written submission, or in person.237 The arbitrator may con-
duct the hearing in any order and manner that is most expeditious, and he or she
may administer oaths and subpoena witnesses and documents. 238 The arbitrator is
the "sole judge of the relevancy, materiality, and admissibility of evidence of-
fered., 239 Each party bears the costs of calling its witnesses. 24° A record of the
hearing is not available unless required by the arbitrator or requested by a party,
who must bear the cost of production and duplication.2 4' Ex parte communica-
tions with the arbitrator are forbidden.242
After the hearing, the arbitrator has thirty days to issue a written decision that
analyzes the applicable law and explains the decision.2 43 In the event that the
parties settle during arbitration, the arbitrator may issue a consent decision.2'4 The
arbitrator is bound to follow applicable laws, including burdens of proof and subs-
tantive law.245 The arbitrator has the power to determine the aplicable law and
provide all relief that could be provided by a court, but no more.24
The employee has the power to decide if the arbitrator's decision is binding.
Within thirty days of the arbitrator's decision, the employee must determine
whether he or she wants to be bound by the decision,247 In the event that the em-
233. Id. at 7.
234. E-mail from Edward N. Gadsden, Jr., Coca-Cola former Vice President, Human Resources, to
Suzette M. Malveaux (Mar. 27, 2009) (on file with author).
235. Coke Rules, supra note 5, at 7.
236. Id. at 19.
237. Id. at 18.
238. The arbitrator's subpoena power is enforceable by court order. See FAA, 9 U.S.C. §7 (2006) (an
arbitrator can petition a federal district court to compel attendance of a non-party or punish the person
for contempt).
239. Coke Rules, supra note 5, at 19.
240. Id. at 22.
241. Id. at 19.




246. Id. at 20, 22-23.
The Coke Rules state:
B. Other than provided herein, the substantive legal rights, remedies, and defenses of all Parties
are preserved. In the case of Arbitration, the arbitrator shall have the authority to determine the
applicable law and to order any and all relief, legal or equitable, including punitive damages and
attorney's fees, that a Party could obtain from a court on the basis of the claims made in the Re-
quest for Arbitration.
C. Other than provided herein, Solutions shall not be construed to grant additional substantive,
legal, or contractual rights, remedies, or defenses that would not be applied by a court in the ab-
sence of Solutions.
Id. at 22-23.
247. Id. at 20-21. The Coke Rules state:
Upon receipt of the arbitrator's decision, the employee or former employee initiating Arbitration
will have thirty days to deliver to the Program Manager in writing a determination whether the
employee or former employee wishes to be bound by the arbitrator's decision. If the employee or
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ployee chooses to be bound, the parties are deemed to have consented to a court's
jurisdiction to enforce the arbitral award 48
B. The Advantages of One-Way Binding Arbitration
One-way binding arbitration offers a third approach to resolving workplace
disputes. Where litigation is the more traditional default available for employees
who want to challenge employer misconduct, mandatory pre-dispute arbitration is
the alternative-an alternative quickly becoming the norm. One-way binding
arbitration is an alternative to the alternative. Coke's one-way binding arbitration,
within the context of its Solutions program, offers a fresh way of problem resolu-
tion for employees, employers, and the legal system in general.
1. Benefits for Employees
a. Meaningful Consent
One-way binding arbitration addresses one of the most contentious and troub-
ling features of compulsory pre-dispute arbitration agreements-the lack of mea-
ningful consent. 2 49 Such agreements are contracts of adhesion-4ake-it-or-leave-it
propositions that an employee must accept as a condition of his or her employ-
ment. 2 5  An employee is not free to negotiate this term out of the employment
former employee notifies the Program Manager timely that he or she wishes to be bound by the
arbitrator's decision, or if the employee or former employee fails to deliver to the Program Man-
ager any determination in a timely manner, the arbitrator's decision will be binding on all Parties,
except to the extent that such decision may be vacated or amended pursuant to the Federal Arbi-
tration Act, and judgment upon the decision of the arbitrator may be entered and enforced in any
federal or state court having jurisdiction over the Parties pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act.
If the employee or former employee delivers to the Program Manager within thirty days of re-
ceipt of the arbitrator's decision a written determination that he or she does not wish to be bound
by the arbitrator's decision, then that decision shall have no legal effect.
Id.
248. Id. at 22.
249. Compare Ware, Employment Arbitration and Voluntary Consent, supra note 8, at 103-59, with
Jean R. Stemlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool? Debunking the Supreme Court's Preference for Bind-
ing Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 701-11 (1996); Heidi M. Hellekson, Note, Taking the "Alter-
native" Out of the Dispute Resolution of Title VII Claims: The Implications of a Mandatory Enforce-
ment Scheme of Arbitration Agreements Arising out of Employment Contracts, 70 N.D. L. REV. 435
(1994). See also Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 900 (1994):
Consent is the master concept that defines the law of contracts in the United States.... [It] ex-
presses the primacy of individualistic values in our culture. To say that one cannot be bound by a
promise that one did not voluntarily and knowingly make is to say that the individual should be
the author of her own undertakings....
See generally Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV.
1173, 1179-80 (1983).
For an interesting counterargument that informed consent in contracts in a mass-market context is not a
good to be maximized, but an information cost to be minimized, see Joshua Fairfield, The Cost of
Consent: Optimal Standardization in the Law of Contract, Washington & Lee Public Legal Studies
Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 2008-31, June 8, 2008, available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=l 141843 (last visited Apr. 6, 2009).
250. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
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contract; instead, he is merely free to forego the job altogether.25' If such agree-
ments continue to multiply, there will be few places where an employee can work
without foregoing his right to bring future claims in court.
While mandatory arbitration forces an employee to use arbitration instead of
the court system, one-way binding arbitration softens the blow. The Solutions
program still compels an employee to utilize the arbitration process as the last step
to resolve a workplace dispute and as a condition of employment.252 Therefore,
the employee, to some extent, is subject to another type of contract of adhe-
sion--he must be willing to give arbitration a try.253 Still, this requirement is in
some ways no more onerous than court-mandated ADR as a prerequisite to court
access. 4  One-way binding arbitration, however, empowers the employee to
choose between the arbitrator's decision or going to court if she does not like the
outcome. Should the employee choose to be bound by the arbitrator's decision, at
that point, the employee consents to the legitimacy of the forum. 255 After pro-
ceeding through arbitration and receiving an outcome--favorable or unfavora-
ble--the employee is in a unique and extraordinary position to evaluate the desi-
rability of the arbitral forum as an alternative to litigation. The employee's con-
sent to the forum is informed, meaningful, and real.
Moreover, the fact that the company is bound by the arbitral decision-no
matter what the outcome---demonstrates the company's confidence in the fo-
rum.25 6 The company's unilateral commitment to the arbitral forum shows, in a
very concrete way, that it views the forum as a legitimate alternative to litigation,
but does not require the employee to view it the same.
The employer's willingness to be bound by the arbitration outcome, while not
requiring the same from the employee, sends a message of loyalty to the process.
The employee benefits by knowing that the company believes in the system and is
willing to "put its money where its mouth is."
251. Where jobs are scarce because of difficult economic conditions - as they are now - employees
will have even less capacity to negotiate terms of employment. Employees, grateful to have a job at all,
may be more tempted to forego their rights.
252. Coke Rules, supra note 5, at 14.
253. In critiquing a similar one-way binding arbitration process conducted by the Better Business
Bureau, called "conditionally binding" arbitration, Professor Jean R. Stemlight states, "[F]rom a fair-
ness perspective, I am more comfortable requiring all disputants to elect a process pre-decision, rather
than providing one, but not both disputants with a post-decision veto." Stemlight, In Defense of Man-
datory Binding Arbitration (If Imposed on the Company), supra note 8, at 85 n.17. I am too. However,
given that the alternative (mandatory, pre-dispute binding arbitration) is likely here to stay, one-way
binding arbitration is an attractive alternative. The employee may ultimately extract herself from the
arbitration process and go to court to vindicate her employment rights.
254. See The Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, 28 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1998). The ADR Act
of 1998 went into effect on October 30, 1998, and requires each federal district court to "authorize,...
devise and implement its own alternative dispute resolution program... to encourage and promote the
use of alternative dispute resolution in its district." Id. Pursuant to the act, each district court must
adopt a local rule that requires civil litigants to consider using an ADR process. Id.
255. Coke Rules, supra note 5, at 20-22.
256. Telephone Interview with Edward N. Gadsden, Jr., Coca-Cola Vice President, Human Re-
sources, (Dec. 24, 2008) (on file with author).
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b. The Benefits of Both Worlds
The one-way binding nature of the arbitration gives the employee the best of
both worlds: arbitration and litigation. The employee not only gets "two bites at
the apple," or two opportunities to prevail, she also obtains advantages she would
not otherwise receive under either arbitration or litigation alone. The employee
obtains the benefits of arbitration without its usual drawbacks. To the extent that
arbitration is cheaper, faster, and more flexible than litigation, the employee bene-
fits from being compelled to try this system before bringing her case in court. To
the extent that arbitration produces superior outcomes by superior means, the em-
ployee is required to do what is "good" for her by giving arbitration a shot-an
admittedly paternalistic requirement.
Solutions offers its employees many of the benefits of arbitration. For exam-
ple, an employee need not pay the fees and costs of the arbitrator or the AAA, and
the employee is permitted to take time off from work to participate in arbitra-
tion.257 The Solutions arbitration is, by design, a quick procedure: the employee
must submit a Request for Arbitration no more than thirty days after the comple-
tion of mediation; 258 after arbitration, the arbitrator has thirty days to issue a deci-
sion in writing, analyzing the applicable law and explaining the decision;25 9 and
within thirty days of the arbitrator's decision, the employee must determine
whether he or she wants to be bound by the decision.26 ° Moreover, the arbitral
proceedings provide privacy not usually available in civil litigation.26' An em-
ployee may also obtain a better outcome by using the internal dispute resolution
procedure. Early and open communication with the relevant players prior to arbi-
tration--the fifth and final step in Solutions--may result in superior outcomes.
26 2
This may be more true given employees' dismal success rates in federal district
court and troubling reversal rates in federal appellate courts, discussed supra.
The Solutions program, in particular, contains many of the procedural safe-
guards found in civil litigation. For example, discovery-critical to an em-
ployee's ability to meet his burden of proof--is robust. Solutions tracks the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure in its discovery provisions regarding document re-
quests, depositions, interrogatories, and disclosure of expert testimony.26 3 The
257. Coke Rules, supra note 5, at 7.
258. Id. at 14.
259. Id. at 20.
260. Id. at 20-21.
261. Id. at 21.
262. See Interview with Gadsden, supra note 256 (one of the benefits of Solutions is that it gives
employees another option which may be more effective than litigation); Telephone Interview with
Edward N. Gadsden, Jr., Coca-Cola Vice President, Human Resources (Apr. 9, 2009) (on file with
author) (describing flexibility and creative outcomes possible in the Solutions steps proceeding arbitra-
tion).
263. Coke Rules, supra note 5, at 16-17. Specifically, the Coke Rules:
[T]he arbitrator will direct that the Parties comply with:
i. reasonable requests for production and for the exchange of documentary evidence as
contemplated by Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;
ii. requests for the deposition of the Employee and the depositions of appropriate em-
ployees of the Company;
iii. requests for responses of up to 25 interrogatories, including sub-parts, as contemplated
by Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and
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arbitrator may even permit additional depositions and discovery, sua sponte, or
upon a showing of good cause, 264 and he or she may issue subpoenas for non-party
265depositions. Moreover, the arbitrator is bound to follow applicable law, includ-
ing the burdens of proof and the substantive law. 26 6 The arbitrator provides a
written record of the proceedings, analyzing the applicable law and explaining the
267decision. A record of the hearing can be made available, if required by the
arbitrator or requested by a party, albeit at the requesting party's expense.16 1 Solu-
tions arbitration, thus, in many ways, provides the kind of transparency, accounta-
bility, and rigorous advocacy found in civil litigation.269
In addition to providing procedural protections, Solutions benefits all em-
ployees. Given their representation in Coke's workforce, white and male em-
ployees turn out to be major beneficiaries of the program. For example, for those
cases where demographic information was provided, their representation in the
program each year was as follows: July 2002 through September 2003, 59% white
and 56% men; 270 October 2003 to August 2004, 46% white and 49% men; 271 Oc-
tober 2004 to August 2005, 28% white and 59% men; 27 2 and October 2005 to
August 2006, 46% white and 57% men.273 Of those minorities who use Solutions,
274however, the "vast majority" are African-Americans. While Solutions has
evolved as a by-product of the settlement agreement on behalf of African-
Americans alleging race discrimination, it has clearly worked to the benefit of all
Coke employees.
After an extensive arbitration process, replete with procedural features often
found in civil litigation, in the event that the employee does not prevail, he does
not suffer the same fate of those subjected to normal arbitration. If the Coke em-
ployee loses, he may reject the arbitrator's decision and proceed to court. Nor-
mally in mandatory arbitration, an employee has very little chance of overturning
iv. the disclosure of expert testimony as contemplated by Rule 26(a)(2) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
Id.
264. Id. at 17.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 20.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 19. However, the requesting party must bear the cost of production and duplication. Id.
269. Solutions also incorporates the standards of the AAA. See id. at 14; see also E-mail from Joseph
P. Moan, Coca-Cola Company Senior Management Counsel, Employment Law, to Suzette M. Mal-
veaux (Mar. 5, 2009) (on file with author). To the extent that the AAA protections are sufficiently
robust, the AAA standard insures a certain degree of quality and rigor in the Solutions arbitration. The
AAA, while not perfect, provides a floor of due process protection through its Due Process Protocols.
For a critique of the Due Process Protocols, see generally Margaret M. Harding, The Limits of the Due
Process Protocols, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 369 (2004).
270. Coke Second Task Force Report, supra note 159, at 48. Coke's First Task Force Report, cover-
ing through June 2002, did not report the number of cases brought into Solutions. The Solutions pro-
gram was just getting off the ground at this point.
271. Coke Third Task Force Report, supra note 159, at 47.
272. Coke Fourth Task Force Report, supra note 146, at 46.
273. Coke Fifth Task Force Report, supra note i, at 46.
274. Id. at 46-47; see also Coke Fourth Task Force Report, supra note 146, at 46 (75%); Coke Third
Task Force Report, supra note 159, at 47 (62%); Coke Second Task Force Report, supra note 159, at
48 (79%).
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275an arbitrator's decision because of the limited review of arbitral awards. By
rejecting the arbitral decision, the Coke employee, however, gets to start over,
complete with the benefit of full appellate review, should the court also rule in the
employer's favor.
Solutions not only gives the employee an opportunity to start over, but to start
out ahead. For example, the employee has the opportunity to get "free discovery"
prior to proceeding to court. While the discovery is not in fact "free" (quite the
276opposite), and the employee is not permitted to use the actual discovery col-
lected through the arbitration process (because of the confidentiality provision of
Solutions),277 the employee gets-for all intents and purposes-access to much of
the information needed to bring her case in court. The employee learns the
strengths and weaknesses of the case, defendant's counterclaims and defenses, and
the documents and witnesses necessary to successfully pursue her case in court.278
c. Due Process
Probably the most important benefit to the employee of one-way binding arbi-
tration is the benefit that is the least visceral and concrete-4he provision of due
process. Fundamental to the United States legal system is the notion that a person
has a right to his or her "day in court.' 279 As the Supreme Court recognized in
Marbury v. Madison, "[t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the
right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives
an injury. '280 The Supreme Court has long recognized the supremacy of one's
right to be heard, established by the United States Constitution. 28 1 The Solutions
275. 9 U.S.C. §10(a) (2006) (an arbitral award is granted full faith and credit and can only be over-
turned on the basis of very narrow grounds); see, e.g., E. Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Work-
ers of Am., Dist. 17, 531 U.S. 57, 66-67 (2000) (holding that it was not a violation of public policy for
arbitrator to reinstate employee in a safety-sensitive position who had twice tested positive for mariju-
ana use, even where employer argued reinstatement would compromise the health and safety of oth-
ers).
276. Each party must bear its own discovery costs, including costs for duplication and expert services.
Coke Rules, supra note 5, at 22.
277. Id. at 21.
278. While one-way binding arbitration may give the employee an advantage in later litigation, it
seems unlikely that it would go far as to encourage an employee to pursue civil litigation. Replicating
much of what occurred in arbitration countenances against the efficiency gained by engaging in the
process.
279. See FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 6.7, at 311 (Little Brown & Co. Law &
Business, 4th ed. 1992) ("Another characteristic American value is the right to have one's say, specifi-
cally, to have one's 'day in court'); Richards v. Jefferson County, Ala., 517 U.S. 793, 798 (1996)
("deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in court") (quoting Martin v.
Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 761-62 (1989) (internal citations omitted)).
280. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803).
281. Traux v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 332 (1921) ("The due process clause requires that every man
shall have the protection of his day in court, and the benefit of the general law, a law which hears
before it condemns... "); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914) ("The fundamental requisite of
due process of law is the opportunity to be heard"); see also Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)
("If the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be a proper subject of relief,
he ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his claim on the merits"); LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTrrLIONAL LAW 666 (Foundation Press, 2d ed. 1988) (1978) ("[There is] intrinsic
value in the due process right to be heard" because "[w]hatever its outcome, such a hearing represents
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program recognizes this right to one's "day in court" through its one-way binding
arbitration provision. The employee is compelled to arbitrate his or her claim, but
arbitration is not a substitute for the court system.
Of course, due process does not actually entitle a plaintiff to resolve griev-
ances only through the court system, 2 but rather entitles the plaintiff notice and
an opportunity to be heard-an entitlement often accomplished through arbitration
with limited review by the courts. The Supreme Court has consistently upheld the
enforceability of arbitration agreements under various federal civil rights statutes,
concluding that "so long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its
statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to serve
both its remedial and deterrent function." 
283
However, even though an arbitral forum may provide an employee with a per-
fectly sufficient opportunity to be heard, so entrenched is the notion that everyone
is entitled to their proverbial "day in court," that such deprivation is likely to meet
resistance. Moreover, to the extent that an employee does not provide meaningful
consent to the alternative forum and is consequently denied court access, due
process is implicated. Such due process concerns are ameliorated by one-way
binding arbitration.
d. Enhanced Relationship with Employer
Finally, an important by-product of Coke's Solutions program is the positive
impact it has had on employees' perceptions of the company. Coke's efforts to
diversify its workforce and ensure fair treatment have not gone unnoticed by its
employees, as demonstrated in survey data collected from 2002 to 2006.
At the request of the company, for every year from 2003 to 2006, an indepen-
dent firm conducted an anonymous electronic survey of Coke's Corporate and
North America group employees. 28" The firm used questions first designed and
asked by the Task Force and Joint Experts in 2002.285 The survey yielded statisti-
cally significant data about the workforce's perceptions of the diversity climate,
286
a valued human interaction in which the affected person experience at least the satisfaction of partici-
pating in the decision that vitally concerns her").
282. See discussion supra at Part 11.
283. 14 Penn Plaza L.L.C. v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1471-72 (2009); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985); see also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991) (same); Green Tree Fin. Corp. -Ala, v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90
(2000) (same).
284. The sample size surveyed varied by year. In 2002, 2004 and 2006, the survey was given to
Coke's entire U.S. workforce (Corporate and North America). In 2004, 3,824 (87% of the sample)
responded, and in 2006, 4,700 (74% of the sample) responded. Coke Third Task Force Report, supra
note 159, at 24; Coke Fifth Task Force Report, supra note 1, at 21. The 2003 survey was given to
roughly 680 employees, who participated in focus groups and were randomly selected. Coke Second
Task Force Report, supra note 159, at 23. The 2005 survey was given to 2,638 employees, which was
69% of a sample of randomly selected employees. Coke Fourth Task Force Report, supra note 146, at
22.
285. Coke Fifth Task Force Report, supra note 1, at 21.
286. The items included in the survey, first conducted in April 2002 are as follows:
* The Company consistently treats all employees fairly.
• Senior management visibly demonstrates that having a diverse workforce is important for the
Company's business success.
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company climate,287 and fairness of the human resources processes. 288 Diversity
climate was measured each year on the basis of employees' perceptions of the
company's commitment to diversity and equal opportunity, senior management's
demonstration of that commitment and of diversity as a business goal, and the
company's fair and consistent treatment of its employees.289 Company climate
was measured each year on the basis of employees' pride in the company, wil-
lingness to say good things about the company to others, and commitment to
working for the company. 29° Fairness of the Problem Resolution System was
measured each year on the basis of employees' awareness of, and comfort with,
the various programs (i.e., Solutions, Ombuds Office, hotline, etc.), knowledge of
how to use them, and employees' perceptions of the company's efficacy in res-
ponding to complaints, communication that discrimination is unacceptable, and
fair treatment of employees who register workplace complaints.291
In 2006, the last year for which data was available, the company received the
highest mean rating for diversity climate from each racial group--white, African-
American, Hispanic, and Asian-American--since the survey was first adminis-
292tered in 2002. On a scale of 1 to 6, from worst to best, the mean rating for di-
versity climate peaked in 2006 for each racial group: white at 4.6, African-
American at 4.2, Hispanic at 4.7 and Asian-American at 4.5.293 The Task Force
observed a "dramatic improvement" between 2005 and 2006 for all of the minori-
ty groups, noting that African-Americans, Hispanics, and Asian-Americans all
jumped at least one-half point on the diversity climate scale.294  This increase
resulted in almost no difference between the perceptions of Hispanics, Asian-
" The Company is committed to creating a work environment that respects diversity and fosters
equal opportunity.
" The Company does not go far enough in fostering an atmosphere that respects diversity and
equal opportunity.
" The way employees are treated in the Company is not affected by prejudice based on bias and
stereotypes.
Coke First Task Force Report, supra note 141, at 16. Employees' perceptions and attitudes were meas-
ured on a six-point scale for each of the items above. Id.
287. Id. at 17. Employees responded to the following general statements about work climate:
" I would highly recommend the Company to a friend seeking employment.
" It would take a lot to get me to leave the company.
" Given the opportunity, I tell others great things about working here.
" The Company's policies and procedures create a positive work environment for me.
" For me the Company is a terrific place to work.
" I am proud to say I work for the Coca-Cola Company.
Id. (crediting Hewitt Associates for developing questions used in employment engagement survey).
288. Id. at 16-17. Employees were asked about their perceptions of fairness for each of the nine
human resource systems addressed by the settlement agreement, including Problem Resolution.
289. Coke Fifth Task Force Report, supra note 1, at 21.
290. Id. at 23.
291. See id. at 47, Coke Fourth Task Force Report, supra note 146, at 47, Coke Third Task Force
Report, supra note 159, at 38; Coke Second Task Force Report, supra note 159, at 48, T.15. "'These
survey items asked: whether employees felt they would be treated fairly if they tried to resolve a dis-
pute at work; whether this might result in a negative impact on their career; and, whether they thought
the Company is committed to having their workplace issues addressed." Id. at 49.
292. Coke Fifth Task Force Report, supra note 1, at 21, 22, Fig. 2.
293. Id. at 22, Fig. 2.
294. Id. at 22.
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Americans and whites by 2006.295 African-American perceptions of the diversity
climate remained the lowest of all the racial groups, but the gap had "narrowed
significantly from past years. ' 296  While employees increasingly gained confi-
dence in Coke's commitment to diversity and equal opportunity, as demonstrated
by the diversity climate composite, employees remained skeptical about the de-
gree to which employment decisions were based on merit.297 Even in 2006, em-
ployees perceived favoritism as a real problem.298
In 2006, the company also received the highest mean rating for company cli-
mate from each racial group: white at 4.9, African-American at 4.8, Hispanic at
5.1, and Asian-American at 4.8. 299 Between 2005 and 2006, each racial group
also jumped at least one-half point on the company climate scale. 300 As noted, by
2006's data, there was barely any difference between the racial groups in compa-
ny climate, with the exception of Hispanics, who scored company climate even
higher. 30 1 The fact that the company climate score is higher for all groups than the
diversity climate score indicates that employees view the company and its brand
more favorably than its workforce practices. However, part of employees' good
feelings about the company's climate overall is attributable to their favorable im-
pression of the company's policies and procedures.
30 3
In 2006, the Task Force concluded in its final report that there had been "sig-
nificant progress" based on the fairness indicators, but did not provide illustrative
quantitative data.30 4  In 2003--the first year the Task Force provided fairness
analysis-it noted that African-Americans, Hispanics, and women "were signifi-
295. Id.
296. Id. at 22, 23. The diversity climate rating for African-Americans was 3.3 in 2002, and 3.1 (its
lowest) in 2003, in comparison to 4.2 in 2006 (the final year). Id. at 22, Fig. 2. The Task Force con-
cluded that this drop may be attributable, in part, to a massive reduction in Coke's workforce, where
restructuring of its North American business operations led to a 10% decrease or 800 job loss through
March 2003. See Coke Second Task Force Report, supra note 159, at 4-5; see also Telephone Inter-
view with Joint Expert and industrial psychologist Dr. Irwin Goldstein (Dec. 23, 2008) (on file with
author) (noting potential negative impact of reduction in force).
According to the Task Force, however, by 2006 employees were "especially positive" on questions
relating to senior management's commitment to diversity and equal opportunity. Coke Fifth Task
Force Report, supra note 1, at 22. Additionally, in 2006 "perceptions of fairness in terms of its human
resources programs and the treatment of individuals were at least a half scale point more positive" than
in 2005. Interestingly, African-Americans hired more recently (within the prior three years) had a
"much more favorable view of the diversity climate" than those who had been with the company
longer. Id. The gender difference was "minimal," with men having a slightly higher diversity climate
score. Id. at 22.
297. Id. ("Items related to advancement being based on who you know and career opportunities not
going to the most qualified persons improved somewhat from last year [2005,] but the absolute scale
values were among the very lowest of all items, the degree of improvement from the very first year is
not very large").
298. Id. ("This perception of favoritism remains as an issue for the Company across all employee
groups").
299. Id. at 23, & Fig. 3.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 23. Again, African-American recent hires were more likely to view the company climate
more favorably than those with greater tenure. Id. at 24. There was no gender difference for company
climate. Id. at 23.
302. Id.
303. Id. ("perceptions of improvements in company climate extend to the effect of policies on em-
ployees themselves").
304. ld. at 47.
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cantly more negative in their assessments" for "nearly all" the fairness indicators,
and that all of the groups' opinions of all of the Problem Resolution Program fair-
ness indicators had gone down since 2002.305
The Task Force's final report demonstrates that as of 2006, this negative per-
ception had turned around. Everyone surveyed was aware of the Problem Resolu-
tion System and employees "generally felt more positively about the Company's
implementation of [the system] . . . with minimal differences based on ethnici-
ty.' '3° 6 By 2006, all racial groups had exceeded the 2002 baseline in knowing how
to address workplace problems, with African-Americans only slightly less know-
ledgeable than the other racial groups.307 The Task Force describes employees'
perception of fairness positively, but as a work-in-progress:
Responses in 2004 and 2005 as to whether the Company makes it clear
that discrimination is unacceptable in the workplace was extremely posi-
tive for whites, Hispanics, and Asian Americans, with African Americans
being significantly less certain but still positive about this issue. In 2006,
the responses for all groups improved significantly with responses being
extremely high for all groups.
In 2004, when asked about whether the Company is effective in respond-
ing to employee complaints about being treated unfairly, the responses
for all groups were not very positive, with African
Americans responding more negatively than others. However, in 2005,
the responses for all groups improved and in 2006 there was further sig-
nificant improvement. These results are consistent with the responses to
whether employees feel they would be treated fairly if they tried to re-
solve a dispute at work. The responses for this survey item in 2006 im-
proved significantly for all groups and there was only a third of a scale
point differences for African Americans as compared to Whites.38
The Task Force expressed its pleasure with the employees' positive percep-
tion of the Problem Resolution System, while also emphasizing the importance of
Coke's ongoing supervision and monitoring. 30 9 In sum, Solutions is not only re-
solving concrete workplace conflicts, but healing relationships between manage-
ment and employees.
305. Coke Second Task Force Report, supra note 159, at 49. Additional information collected from
focus groups confirmed that employees' trust in the Problem Resolution System was initially low. Id.
at 49-50. The Task Force concluded that addition of the mediation and arbitration components to the
initial Problem Resolution System would be helpful. Id. at 50. The drop in fairness indicia for 2003 is
consistent with the scores in diversity climate and company climate among all employees that year. See
Coke Fifth Task Force Report, supra note 1, at 22, 23, Figs. 2 & 3. This drop may be attributable, in
part, to a massive reduction-in-force ("RI"'), as discussed supra at note 296. See Coke Second Task
Force Report, supra note 159, at 4-5; see also Dec. 23, 2008, telephone interview with Goldstein,
supra note 296 (noting potential negative impact of reduction in force).
306. Coke Fifth Task Force Report, supra note 1, at 47.
307. Id.
308. Id. The author was not provided with the underlying data that would have enabled an indepen-
dent and fuller understanding of Coke's progress in this area.
309. Id. at 48.
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2. Benefits for Employer
One-way binding arbitration is also beneficial for the employer because it
preserves the benefits--but excludes the baggage-of mandatory pre-dispute arbi-
tration.
a. One-Way Binding Arbitration Encompasses the Benefits of Mandatory
Pre-Dispute Arbitration
One-way binding arbitration shares many of the typical attributes of mandato-
ry pre-dispute arbitration. For starters, one-way binding arbitration is still manda-
tory; it requires the employee to utilize the company's internal dispute resolution
process, including arbitration. One-way binding arbitration is still a pre-dispute
arrangement; it requires the employee to agree in advance to resolve any future
employment problems through the company's internal dispute resolution process.
One-way binding arbitration is still an employment prerequisite; it requires an
employee to be willing to use Solutions as a condition of employment. It is non-
negotiable.
Coke's one-way binding arbitration offers many of the procedural benefits of
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration. For example, one-way binding arbitration
gives the company the privacy it would enjoy under mandatory pre-dispute arbi-
tration. The confidential process gives the parties the capacity to negotiate free
from the spotlight and scrutiny of the media and other third parties. Additionally,
the relative flexibility of the steps preceding arbitration gives both parties the po-
tential capacity to structure relief in a way that is more individualized, creative,
and satisfying.
310
The Solutions program, in general, and one-way binding arbitration, in partic-
ular, empowers the company to fix the problem. As an alternative process to liti-
gation, Solutions gives the employer an opportunity to bring its knowledge, re-
sources, and expertise to bear on the workplace issue at hand. Not only does this
give the employer the chance to provide a potentially superior process and out-
come, it allows the employer to avoid litigation and the specter of being sued.
Certainly, where a company has taken a beating in the media-as Coke did
here--it has a keen interest in resurrecting its image31' and avoiding future litiga-
tion, which may be more costly, unpredictable, and time consuming. Both of
these goals are accomplished by Solutions.
During the 2002-2006 compliance period, the number of charges filed by em-
ployees with the EEOC decreased steadily each year. The number of new charges
filed per year was as follows: July 2002 through September 2003, 47 cases;
31 2
310. Telephone Interview with Edward N. Gadsden, Jr., former Coca-Cola Vice President, Human
Resources, (Apr. 9, 2009) (on file with author).
311. See Waller & Graves, supra note 135 (describing the communication methods used by Coke on
its Web site to address the negative publicity generated by Ingram v. The Coca-Cola Co.).
312. Coke Second Task Force Report, supra note 159, at 45. Coke's First Task Force Report, cover-
ing through June 2002, did not report the number of charges filed. See Coke First Task Force Report,
supra note 141. Instead, it stated, "EEO will continue to investigate external charges of discrimination,
while the employee resolution department will handle internal charge investigations." Id. at 30.
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October 2003 through September 2004, 19 cases;313 October 2004 through Sep-
tember 2005, 14 cases;314 and October 2005 through September 2006, 11 cases.
In comparison, for each year, employees brought more cases to Solutions for reso-
lution than they filed with the EEOC. The number of cases brought to the compa-
ny's attention per year was as follows: July 2002 through September 2003, 1383 16;
October 2003 to August 2004, 39317; October 2004 to August 2005, 76318; and
October 2005 to August 2006, 47.3I9
The steady decrease in the number of charges filed with the EEOC per year
could suggest that there were fewer workplace problems over time, that em-
ployees were foregoing the use of outside institutions to solve workplace prob-
lems, or both. 320  Any of these three options would be advantageous to Coke.
Assuming the worst case scenario-that the number of workplace disputes did not
decrease--then the decrease in charges illustrates employees' willingness to re-
solve disputes internally. Such employee comfort with using the company's in-
ternal dispute resolution process is promising.
At the same time that employees are increasingly opting not to file charges,
they are using Solutions in significant numbers. The amount of activity in Solu-
tions (in terms of numbers of cases brought), while not showing a steady pattern,
illustrates that employees are giving the company an opportunity to resolve prob-
lems before resorting to administrative action and litigation. The data suggests
employee confidence in Solutions.
Since the implementation of Solutions, Coke's image among its employees
has also improved. Indices, such as diversity climate and company climate, dis-
cussed supra, demonstrate how Coke's reputation has markedly improved among
its employees. Given increasing employee satisfaction with the company, em-
ployees may feel that they need not go outside the company to resolve workplace
disputes, resulting in fewer lawsuits against Coke.
313. Coke Third Task Force Report, supra note 159, at 44.
314. Coke Fourth Task Force Report, supra note 146, at 43.
315. Coke Fifth Task Force Report, supra note 1, at 43.
316. Coke Second Task Force Report, supra note 159, at 48. This represents the number of cases
brought to the attention of the Employee Resolution Department. Id. Coke's First Task Force Report,
covering through June 2002, did not report the number of cases brought into Solutions. See Coke First
Task Force Report, supra note 141. The Solutions program was just getting off the ground at this point.
317. Coke Third Task Force Report, supra note 159, at 47. This represents the number of cases
brought to the attention of the Ethics and Compliance Office. The Task Force, while unclear about why
there was such a significant drop in cases this year, surmised that the "very small" number could be
attributable to the new Solutions program's having been recently announced. Id.
318. Coke Fourth Task Force Report, supra note 146, at 46. This represents the number of cases
brought to the attention of the Ethics and Compliance Office. The Task Force surmised that the in-
crease in cases from the prior year (almost double) was attributable to the timing of the new Solutions
program announcement. Id.
319. Coke Fifth Task Force Report, supra note 1, at 46. This represents the numbers of cases brought
to the attention of the Diversity and Workplace Fairness Office.
320. Telephone Interview with Edward N. Gadsden, Jr., former Coca-Cola Vice President, Human
Resources (Mar. 3, 2009).
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b. The Binding Nature of Arbitration Helps the Company
Certainly, being bound by an adverse arbitral decision without the option of
rejecting it disfavors the company. Having to litigate solely at the employee's
option does too. But ironically, what makes Coke's arbitration program appealing
to employees-its unilateral binding provision--is what also favors the company
in a number of significant ways.
i. Improved Employee Perception
First, the company's commitment to being the only party bound by the arbi-
tration outcome likely builds trust and goodwill with its employees. While there
is no data specifically on how employees rank the Solutions arbitration
process-much less its unilateral binding feature-on the survey's one to six
scale, the data reveals that employees are generally pleased with Coke's problem
resolution process. 321 In the Task Force's final report, published in 2006, it con-
cluded that "employees are more positive that they would be treated fairly if they
tried to resolve a dispute at work.''322 Such optimism is important to the viability
and success of Solutions. Without trust in the company's internal dispute resolu-
tion system, the employees are more likely to look to external institutions, such as
the EEOC and the courts, for relief.
32 3
Building such trust has taken time and remains an ongoing process. At the
nascent period of the settlement agreement, minority employees expressed greater
skepticism than their white counterparts over how fair Coke's human resources
programs were and how successful its budding dispute resolution system would
be. Coke's first challenge was simply ensuring that employees were aware of
its new dispute resolution system and its various components. By the end of the
five-year compliance period, 100 percent of the employees surveyed in 2006 indi-
cated that they were aware of the Ethics and Compliance Office, i.e., the entry
point for Solutions.325 While employees have grown more aware of Coke's inter-
nal dispute resolution system, this does not mean that all employees would be
comfortable actually using it. For example, at the program's inception in 2002,
African-Americans and Hispanics were less comfortable than their white col-
leagues availing themselves of the Open Door process.
326
Moreover, African-American, Hispanic, and female employees at that time
were "significantly more negative" in their perceptions of whether the company
would treat all employees fairly.327 Not only did minority employees' fairness
321. Coke Fifth Task Force Report, supra note 1, at 48 ("employees view the problem resolution
process in a positive manner").
322. Id. at 48.
323. Dec. 24, 2008, interview with Gadsden, supra note 256.
324. Coke First Task Force Report, supra note 141, at 4.
325. Coke Fifth Task Force Report, supra note 1, at 47.
326. Coke Second Task Force Report, supra note 159, at 49. Employees were asked if they were
comfortable, somewhat comfortable, or not comfortable in using the Problem Resolution programs. Id.
327. Id. Survey questions measuring fairness included: "whether employees felt they would be treated
fairly if they tried to resolve a dispute at work; whether this might result in a negative impact on their
career; and whether they thought the Company is committed to having their workplace issues ad-
dressed." Id.
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assessments start out low in 2002,328 they fell even lower in 2003. 329 Employees
initially hesitated to use components such as the Employee Reporting Service (or
hotline) and the Ombuds Office, out of fear that confidentiality would be
breached. 330 Trust among the employees in 2003 was at an all-time low for the
compliance period.33'
Things began to turn around in 2004. Almost all (88%) employees were
aware of the new Ethics and Compliance Office, and more employees (no matter
what their racial makeup) knew what to do if they felt they had been treated un-
fairly 33 2 -an improvement since the survey was first administered in 2002. 333 By
2006, all racial groups were more knowledgeable about what to do in the event of
a workplace problem.334
Over time, employees became more convinced that Coke disapproved of dis-
crimination in the workplace. When asked "whether the company makes it clear
that discrimination is unacceptable in the workplace," in 2004 and 2005, all racial
groups except African-Americans were "extremely positive., 335  African-
Americans, while "positive," were "significantly less certain., 336 By the last year
of the compliance period, though, the assessments by all racial groups had "im-
proved significantly" and their ratings were "extremely high.
3 3 7
Employees' assessment of Coke's efficacy in handling workplace fairness
problems has slowly improved over time. Coke employees were asked "whether
the Company is effective in responding to employee complaints about being
treated unfairly," to which all racial groups' responses in 2004 were "not very
positive." 338 African-Americans were even more negative in their assessment of
the company on this indicator. 339 However, according to the Task Force, in 2005,
employees' assessments had improved, and by 2006, the assessments had signifi-
cantly improved, with African-Americans trailing behind their white counterparts
by only one-third of a scale point on a six-point scale. 34° In sum, the company has
been building employee trust over time through the Solutions program, an impor-
tant component of the company's success in resolving workplace disputes.
328. Coke First Task Force Report, supra note 141, at 4 ("African-American employees were less
positive concerning fairness within the Company than were white employees, particularly with regard
to advancement and career development").
329. Coke Second Task Force Report, supra note 159, at 49 ("As compared to last year [2002], all of
the assessments for all groups, including those for whites, were more negative about Problem Resolu-
tion fairness issues"). See discussion supra at note 296 regarding RIF as possible explanation for
general decline.
330. Id.
331. Id.; see also Coke Fifth Task Force Report, supra note 1, at 47.
332. Coke Third Task Force Report, supra note 159, at 48.
333. Id. at 47.
334. Coke Fifth Task Force Report, supra note 1, at 47 (all groups increased by about one-half scale
point from 2005 to 2006, except for African-Americans who were "slightly less positive"). This does
not mean that all employees were comfortable actually using the process.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Id. Unfortunately, the Task Force Reports do not give quantitative data for these indicators,
making it necessary to rely on the Task Force's characterization of the results.
338. Id.
339. ld.
340. Id. Employees were also asked if they felt they would be treated fairly if they tried to resolve a
dispute at work. The results were similar. Id.
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Moreover, the company's unilateral commitment to the arbitration process
suggests that the company is not trying to control its employees, limit their rights,
or hold them to a different and substandard dispute resolution system. As em-
ployees grow to trust the company's human resources department (the body
tasked with Solutions implementation), they are more likely to trust the company's
other systems and decisions. 34 This trust can translate into greater productivity
and profits.342 Woven throughout Coke's revised policies following the settlement
is the connection between diversity and economic success. Its business model
embraces diversity as a central component of success.343 In sum, one-way binding
arbitration promotes employee trust, which may advance the company's diversity
goals and economic success.
ii. One-Way Binding Arbitration Helps the Company in Future Litigation
Second, the company's unilateral commitment to the arbitral decision is good
for the company because it may help the company prevail in court in a number of
ways. In the event that the employee rejects the arbitral award and takes his case
to court, the employer is all the better for it. Having experienced an arbitration
process that so closely mirrors the court process in many ways, the parties are well
prepared for litigation, and certainly more prepared than they would have been
had they not utilized Solutions. The cost of litigation is lower because the case, in
many ways, has already been "tee-ed up" through Coke's extensive arbitration
process. The parties have narrowed the issues in contention and streamlined the
case down to its central focus. In the event the company must go to court, the
company goes after having tried numerous alternatives and having primed itself
for litigation.
While the company may be well prepared, the employee, on the other hand,
may be battle-fatigued. 34 4 Coke's arbitration process--replete with the potential
for robust discovery, dispositive motions (i.e., Rule 56 summary judgment), and a
full-blown hearing-shares many of the features of civil litigation. Ironically,
these very same features that protect an employee in arbitration may overwhelm
him in the context of litigation. Coke's arbitration process is so extensive, it may
put the employee at a disadvantage-pressuring him to spend money on substan-
tial discovery and motion practice, in the event that Coke does the same.M5
341. Telephone Interview with Gadsden, supra note 256.
342. Id. See also Megacases, supra note 11, at 424-27 ("Corporations are beginning to understand
that diversity in the workforce and in management correlates with financial success. Numerous studies
... have demonstrated that 'diversity is good for business'); Scott Miller & Kirk Miller and Asso-
ciates, Inc., Rewarding Employees When Your Budget Is Tight: 7 low-cost ways to make sure your
employees are happy, healthy workers, ENTREPRENEuR.cOM (Feb. 18, 2005) ("Happy employees are
more productive employees"), available at http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/printthis/49278.html
(last visited Apr. 6, 2009). But see, Russell Cropanzano & Thomas A. Wright, When a "Happy"
Worker is Really a "Productive" Worker; A Review and Further Refinement of the Happy-Productive
Worker Thesis, 53 CONSULTING PSYCHOLOGY JOURNAL: PRACTICE AND RESEARCH 182 (Summer
2001); Rhian Silvestro, Dispelling the Modem Myth: Employee satisfaction and loyalty drive service
profitability, 22-1 INT'L J. OF OPERATIONS & PROD. MGMT. 30 (2002).
343. See discussion infra at Section V.B., "Context Matters."
344. See telephone interview with Gadsden, supra note 256.
345. Id.
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Even if the employee chooses to go to court, the company is in an advanta-
geous position. Where the employer has prevailed in arbitration, and the em-
ployee opts not to be bound by the decision, the EEOC and the court may be
tempted to rule consistently with the arbitrator's decision. Once the employee has
gone through the extensive Solutions arbitration process, due process has likely
been provided and there is little incentive for another decision maker to second-
guess the outcome.346
Finally, the one-way binding aspect of arbitration may turn out to be more
symbolic, given how rare it is that a dispute will get that far. The vast bulk of
workplace disputes are resolved internally in the first three steps of Solutions.
34 7
As a practical matter, the company faces little risk that it will be bound unilateral-
ly to a decision it does not like.348
3. Benefits to the Legal System
a. Promotes Efficiency and Judicial Economy, Supports Settlement, and
Legitimizes Arbitration
One-way binding arbitration not only benefits the parties themselves, but the
legal system in general. In particular, Coke's one-way binding arbitration pro-
motes efficiency. The litigation is more streamlined and efficient because of the
legwork already completed in arbitration. Both parties have narrowed the issues
of contention and can move more quickly to trial. Given the extent to which
Coke's arbitration process incorporates many features of civil litigation--such as
adoption of some of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment, the
presentation of claims, counterclaims and amendments, and identical re-
lief-arbitration saves the parties and the court precious resources and time.349
The judicial economy resulting from one-way binding arbitration encourages
settlement. Empirical evidence indicates that the faster a court schedules trial, the
more likely the case is to settle.350 If an employee rejects the arbitral decision and
instead litigates his case de novo, the parties enter litigation more prepared than
346. Id.
347. Id.; Telephone Interview with Joseph P. Moan, Coca-Cola Company Senior Managing Counsel,
Employment Law (Feb. 16, 2009) (on file with author); See also Coke Fourth Task Force Report,
supra note 146, at 47 (noting only one case going to mediation, where the issue was amicably re-
solved).
348. Feb. 16, 2009, interview with Moan, supra note 347; Dec. 24, 2008, interview with Gadsden,
supra note 256.
349. In critiquing a similar one-way binding arbitration process conducted by the Better Business
Bureau, called "conditionally binding" arbitration, Professor Jean R. Sternlight cautions that "it would
be inefficient to require all disputes to be arbitrated in situations where a substantial number of con-
sumers/employees may then opt for a trial de novo." Sterlight, In Defense of Mandatory Binding
Arbitration (If Imposed on the Company), supra note 8, at 85 n.17. This critique is valid. Here, how-
ever, where the large majority of Coke employee disputes are resolved in the first three stages of Solu-
tions, this inefficiency is minimized.
350. See, e.g., THOMAS E. WILLGING, TRENDS IN ASBESTOS LITIGATION, Executive Summary at xvii
(Federal Judicial Center 1987) ("Cases settle individually or in groups of hundreds when firm, credible
trial dates are scheduled"); id. at 54 ("the single most important aspect of judicial management of
asbestos litigation is the setting of a firm, credible trial date"); id. at 59 ("In the opinion of the judges
and lawyers interviewed, the use of firm trial dates controls the settlement process").
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they otherwise would be. One-way binding arbitration sets the parties on the fast
track to trial, thereby increasing the likelihood of settlement. Given the over-
crowded federal dockets,35' this by-product of Coke's dispute resolution system is
significant.
The legitimacy of arbitration as a dispute resolution forum is enhanced when
employees knowingly consent to use it and to be bound by it.352 One-way binding
arbitration removes the stigma attached to arbitration--that it is a forum forced
upon unwitting employees who have little bargaining power, presented in a con-
tract of adhesion. Solutions arbitration does not bar an employee from her "day in
court"--a phrase often shorthand for due process. By stripping away the exploita-
tive aspect of arbitration found in compulsory pre-dispute arbitration agreements,
the true value of the forum can be recognized.
b. Solutions Aids the Administrative Exhaustion Process
i. Burden on Employee
On the other hand, for the employee who wants to go to court, the five-step
Solutions program--culminating in one-way binding arbitration--erects a series
of requirements as a pre-requisite to court access. Employees who simply want to
initiate the litigation process must first go through all five progressive steps of
Solutions, which may impose additional costs, delay, and burdens.
353
351. Solutions provides much needed reprieve for an overwhelmed federal judiciary:
[T]he federal judiciary's resources are being stretched to the limit. This is particularly true in the
district courts .... [T]heir raw caseload, which itself has skyrocketed and given no indication of
leveling off in the last fifteen years despite passage of the numerous provisions designed to re-
duce congestion within the federal courts. Without additional reforms, according to a U.S. Judi-
cial Conference report, 'the picture in 2020 can only be described as nightmarish.' And ... the
consequences of judicial overload already are being felt in the form of delays, errors, and inde-
terminacy in the case law.
Christopher R. McFadden, Removal, Remand, and Reimbursement under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), 87
MARQ. L. REv. 123, 128-29 (2003); see also Allan Kanner & M. Ryan Casey, Daubert and the Disap-
pearing Jury Trial, 69 U. PnT. L. REV. 281, 299-300 (2007) ("Federal judges in many districts are
burdened with an impossible caseload .... The pressure on judges to 'clear their dockets' has never
been greater"); J. Jason Boyeskie, Comment, A Matter of Opinion: Federal Rule of Appellate Proce-
dure 32.1 and Citation to Unpublished Opinions, 60 ARK. L. REV. 955, 962 (2008) ("Since 1988, the
number of cases heard at the appellate level has almost doubled").
352. See Schwartz, If You Love Arbitration, supra note 9, at 401; Richard C. Reuben, Democracy and
Dispute Resolution: The Problem of Arbitration, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 279, 282 (2004) ("[A]s
a dispute-resolution process, arbitration is generally undemocratic,... it acquires democratic legitima-
cy when parties actually agree to arbitrate their disputes because it furthers the unifying democratic
value of personal autonomy").
353. Dec. 24, 2008, interview with Gadsden, supra note 256. The Coke Solutions program differs
from its predecessor, the Texaco Solutions program, in this significant way. Unlike the Texaco Solu-
tions, employees at Coke do not have the same freedom to skip steps in the Solutions process. See
Texaco Solutions brochure at 7, 8, 10, 11 (provided by Joseph P. Moan) (on file with author) (describ-
ing how employees may skip steps in Texaco's four-step Solutions program if they are not satisfied or
feel uncomfortable). The Texaco Solutions program is comprised of four steps, some of which an
employee may opt out of prior to being permitted to file a charge with the EEOC. Id. at 2, 7, 8, 10, 11.
The Coke Solutions program has even more (five) steps and does not give the employee the freedom to
dispense with those he does not find useful. Coke Rules, supra note 5, at 4-7, 10.
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An employee is already required to exhaust his administrative remedies
through the EEOC or a local equivalent, prior to filing in court.3 54 The EEOC
process itself includes an investigation and mediation, in which the employee
must participate. 5  Thus, employees are already obligated to negotiate with the
employer and make a serious effort at resolving their claims short of litigation.
Under Solutions, an employee must go through three steps within the company,
and two steps (mediation and arbitration) outside of the company prior to bringing
civil litigation. The Solutions progressive five-step program thus imposes an ex-
haustion requirement of its own, which could indeed leave an employee exhausted
by the time he obtains access to court.
3 56
Aside from the effort, delay, and potential costs an employee may have to in-
cur by participating in Solutions, the larger issue that looms is the propriety of
such pre-requisites for access to the court system. For those employees who simp-
ly wish to file a charge with the EEOC in hopes of filing a claim in court, the So-
lutions system may be perceived as redundant or, worse, obstructionist. The
EEOC, as the agency tasked with enforcing employment discrimination laws and
promulgating regulations, is uniquely positioned to broker settlements between
employers and employees. 357 Its independent role as a government agency, its
broad mission to serve the public interest,358 and its expertise in employment mat-
ters all suggest that it should not be stymied by internal corporate resolution sys-
tems, much less supplanted by them.
ii. Welcome Relieffor Administrative Agencies and Employees
However, far from being the interloper described above, Solutions benefits
the legal system by providing welcome relief to a beleaguered and battle-fatigued
government agency. The EEOC's own cooperation with Solutions belies the no-
tion that the agency's method of dispute resolution is superior to that of Coke, or
other corporate employers.359 Indeed, the EEOC has participated in, if not led, the
354. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2000) (Title VU of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)
(2000) (Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967); 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (2000) (Americans
With Disabilities Act of 1990); see also Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807 (1980) (discussing
employee's 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 option of filing with local fair employment practice (FEP) agency
rather than the EEOC for Title VH claims).
355. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) ("If the Commission determines after such investigation that there is
reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true, the Commission shall endeavor to eliminate any
such alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and
persuasion").
356. Dec. 24, 2008, telephone interview Gadsden, supra note 256.
357. See E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 285-88 (2002) (describing EEOC's role); see
also Kathryn Moss et al., Unfunded Mandate: An Empirical Study of the Implementation of the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 50 U. KAN. L. REv. 1,
6-24 (2001-2002) (historical overview of agency).
358. See Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. at 287-88.
359. The EEOC has "added a significant number of employers to the ones already participating" in its
Referral Back Pilot Program discussed infra. Letter from Nicholas M. Inzeo, director of Office of
Field Programs, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Washington, D.C., to Mark Sny-
derman, director, Compliance Programs, Coca Cola Enterprises, Inc., 1 Coca Cola Plaza, Atlanta,
Georgia (Mar. 29, 2005) (provided by Joseph P. Moan) (on file with author) [hereinafter EEOC Refer-
ral Back Letter]. The Department of Labor has a similar arrangement with Texaco, following the
company's historic employment discrimination class action settlement. Dec. 24, 2008, telephone
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effort to outsource its investigation and mediation functions to the company. Spe-
cifically, the EEOC accepted Coke's Solutions program as part of the agency's
Referral Back Pilot Program.360 As part of the agency's program, the EEOC
would encourage any non-unionized employee who filed a charge with the
EEOC--but who had not yet exhausted Coke's Solutions process---to resume
participation in the company's internal process. 361 The Solutions brochure pro-
vided to employees states:
The goal of Solutions is to resolve workplace issues without legal action.
Participation in Solutions does not preclude you, however, from pursuing
any available legal remedy.
If you file a charge with an administrative agency or file a lawsuit related
to an issue covered by Solutions, the Company may ask the agency or
court to delay any action until you have attempted full resolution through
Solutions. By continuing employment with the Company, you agree not
to oppose the Company's request to delay such proceedings.
362
As part of its Referral Back Pilot Program, the EEOC may, at Coke's request
and with the employee's consent, refer the employee back to Coke's Solutions
Interview with Gadsden, supra note 256. See also Texaco Solutions Brochure, supra note 127, at
13(describing Texaco's Solutions program, upon which Coke was modeled, and stating that if a Tex-
aco employee files a lawsuit prior to participating in Solutions' one-way binding arbitration, "it is
Texaco's intent to ask the court to suspend the court proceedings until Step Four [arbitration] has been
utilized"); The Coca-Cola Company, Solutions: You Talk We Listen. An Active Approach to
Workplace Issue Resolution Brochure (provided by Joseph P. Moan, Coca-Cola Senior Managing
Counsel, Employment Law) (on file with author) [hereinafter Coke Solutions Brochure].
360. The EEOC Referral Back letter states:
Your Solutions program has been accepted as part of our Referral Back Pilot Program. Under this
program, individuals who file charges of employment discrimination against Coca Cola Enter-
prises, Inc. (Coca Cola) will be offered the opportunity to have their charge referred back to Coca
Cola for participation in your internal dispute resolution program.
EEOC Referral Back Letter, supra note 359.
361. Id.
362. Coke Solutions Brochure, supra note 359, at 10. The Coke Rules state the same:
Participation in Solutions does not preclude an employee from pursuing any available legal re-
medy; Solutions is not intended either to restrict or expand the employee's or the Company's le-
gal rights. However, should an employee file a charge with an administrative agency or file a
lawsuit in court concerning a dispute subject to Solutions, the Company may ask the administra-
tive agency or the court to delay proceeding with the charge or lawsuit until the employee and the
Company have attempted fully to resolve the dispute through Solutions. By continuing employ-
ment with the Company, each employee agrees not to oppose the Company's request to delay
such proceedings. If the agency or court declines to delay proceedings, or if the Company deter-
mines not to seek delay of proceedings, the Program Manager may preclude further handling of
the relevant workplace issue through Solutions.
Coke Rules, supra note 5, at 8, Section 5 "Effect on Legal Rights." See also id at 10, Section 12
"Consent" ("Participation [in Solutions] includes an agreement by each employee not to oppose any
motion or request by the Company before any administrative agency or court to defer proceedings on
any Legal Dispute until the Parties have attempted fully to resolve the Legal Dispute through Solu-
tions").
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program to exhaust its internal resolution system.363 This collaboration has been
helpful in resolving workplace disputes in a timely and amicable manner.
364
On the one hand, the collaboration between the EEOC and Coke is part of a
larger phenomenon 365 worth examining. As the EEOC starts to share, if not out-
source, its traditional dispute resolution function, it is important to ensure that the
agency does not abdicate its role as public advocate for the employee. The EEOC,
as the independent governmental body responsible for enforcing federal employ-
ment discrimination statutes, 366 is tasked with investigating employment discrimi-
nation charges, determining reasonable cause findings, and trying to eliminate
discrimination through "informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persua-
sion. ' 367 The EEOC plays its own distinctive and important role in combating
workplace discrimination, separate and apart from the aggrieved individual em-
ployee. 368 Certainly, the agency must keep its distance from the employer to pre-
serve its impartiality. Just as the privatization of the civil justice system poses
potential risks to due process, the privatization of the administrative agency sys-
tem could do the same.
On the other hand, the fact that the EEOC has incorporated Solutions into its
own conciliation process reflects a justified pragmatism. Overwhelmed 369 and
363. Id. By working at Coke, the employee is deemed to have agreed not to oppose Coke's request to
delay administrative proceedings until after Solutions has been exhausted. Id. However, should an
employee oppose the delay, this does not mean the employee loses his or her job. Telephone Interview
with Joseph P. Moan, Coca-Cola Senior Managing Counsel, Employment Law, with Suzette M. Mal-
veaux (Dec. 22, 2008) (on file with author).
364. The EEOC has stated:
Employers have adopted internal programs for informally resolving employment disputes inter-
nally, including discrimination claims. Such programs have assisted in the resolution of claims
promptly and amicably. Through a Pilot Program, the EEOC is exploring whether employer-
provided dispute resolution programs that operate fairly and voluntarily can serve as an effective
means of resolving employment discrimination charges filed with the EEOC. Under the Pilot, a
charging party who has filed a charge against an employer may elect to have his or her charge
referred to the employer's internal ADR program in an attempt to resolve the dispute....
Under the Pilot, further processing of the charge by EEOC would be suspended for up to 60 days
while you and The Coca-Cola Company (Coca-Cola) attempt a resolution. If a resolution is
reached through Coca-Cola's Solutions Program, your charge will be closed pursuant to EEOC's
procedures governing withdrawal and settlement of charges. If the dispute is not resolved, the
EEOC will resume its processing of your charge.
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Pilot Program Fact Sheet "Resolving Charges
Through an Employer's Internal Dispute Resolution Program" attached to EEOC Referral Back
Letter, supra note 359.
365. See EEOC Referral Back Letter, supra note 359 ("Over the past eight months we have added a
significant number of employers to the ones already participating in our pilot program").
366. See Michael Selmi, The Value of the EEOC: Reexamining the Agency's Role in Employment
Discrimination Law, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 6 (1996) (describing EEOC's primary enforcement responsi-
bility for various federal employment discrimination statutes).
367. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2000).
368. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (where the Commission has not reached an acceptable concilia-
tion agreement with the employer, the agency may bring a civil action, in which the individual ag-
grieved employee may intervene); see also E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 290-92
(2002) (holding that employee's arbitration agreement with employer did not bar the EEOC from
pursuing victim-specific judicial relief in enforcement action brought against employer under the
ADA).
369. See Selmi, supra note 366, at 2 n.2, 4, 8 (describing ineffectiveness of EEOC and its backlog
from the agency's inception and concluding that it "should either be eliminated or substantially re-
formed"). See also Moss et al., supra note 347, at 6 ("[Tlhe core problem for the Agency [EEOC] has
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underfunded,370 the agency is in no position to take an entrenched stand about the
proper role government and the private sector should play vis-h-vis each other in
employee dispute resolution. 371 The "resource starved" institution has subjected
complainants to long delays and arguably greater risk of retaliation by their em-
ployers, as a result of such delays.372 The careful investigation and conciliation
process envisioned for the agency has been consistently undermined by a dearth of
funding and staffing. Not surprisingly, the Director of the EEOC's Office of Field
Programs, who accepted Coke into the agency's Referral Back Pilot Program,
373
recently conceded that the EEOC's backlog and limited resources negatively im-
pacted the agency's effectiveness. 374 The Acting EEOC Chairman has concluded
the same.375 The National Council of EEOC Locals gave the EEOC an "F" for its
2008 performance, noting: "Rock bottom staffing and record high charges of dis-
been the sheer enormity of its case load"); Will Obama's pledge become reality for people with disabil-
ities?, 12 FD. EEO ADVISOR, (Mar. 1, 2009) ("EEOC is processing the most claims it has had since
opening its doors in 1965"). See Steve Vogel, EEOC Confronts Growing Backlog, Dwindling Staff,
WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 2009, at A13 (EEOC "facing its largest caseload in at least a quarter-century"
resulting in an "overwhelmed workforce"). Cf Michael A. Szkodzinski, Comment, An Analysis of the
EEOC's Issuance of Early Right-to-Sue Letters: Does it Promote Judicial Efficiency or Encourage
Administrative Incompetence?, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 689, 690 (2001) (describing practice in numerous
jurisdictions where the EEOC issues early right-to-sue letters to employees because of its inability to
act on charges within 180 days from the date the charge is filed).
370. Moss et al., supra note 347, at 5-6 ("The history of the EEOC, from its inception in the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 to the present day [2002], can be seen as a series of attempts to deal with the ines-
capable fact that the Agency lacked the resources to do the job it had been assigned to do"); Will Ob-
ama's pledge become reality for people with disabilities?, supra note 369 (EEOC employee describing
EEOC during the Bush Administration as "resource starved"). See Vogel, supra note 369 (describing
"agency's higher workload and decreasing resources" and negative impact it is having on enforce-
ment).
371. The EEOC has arguably also lacked the political will to aggressively pursue certain types of
employment cases. For example, Joseph Rich, Director of Fair Housing and Community Development,
Lawyer's Committee for Civil Rights Under the Law, testified on Nov. 16, 2006, before the U.S.
Senate Judiciary Committee, that the EEOC under the Bush Administration brought relatively few
race-based pattern or practice cases on behalf of African-Americans:
Since the beginning of the Bush Administration 34 Title VII cases have been filed, of which ten
are pattern or practice cases, the most important employment discrimination cases brought by the
Department both in their impact and complexity. Only two of the pattern or practice cases
brought by the Division allege discrimination against African-Americans and these were not filed
until February and July, 2006, more than five years into the Bush Administration and after consi-
derable attention had been brought to the failure to bring such cases. In its first two years alone,
the Clinton Administration filed thirteen pattern or practice cases, eight of which raised race dis-
crimination claims. Moreover two of the ten employment pattern or practice filings-filed before
the recent cases alleging discrimination against African-Americans-are "reverse" discrimination
cases, alleging discrimination against whites.
Testimony of Mr. Joseph Rich, Director of Fair Housing and Community Development (Nov. 16,
2006), available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfmrenderforprint=1 &id=2434&witid=5849 (last
visited Apr. 10, 2009).
372. Vogel, supra note 369.
373. See EEOC Referral Back Letter, supra note 359.
374. See Vogel, supra note 368 (quoting Nicholas M. Inzeo, director of the EEOC Office of Field
Programs, who stated, "If we had more investigators to investigate and more trial attorneys to litigate,
we would do more... Would they tell you they're overworked? Oh yeah.").
375. Stuart Ishimaru, an EEOC Commissioner since 2003 and recently appointed acting chair of the
EEOC, concluded, "If you have a staff cut of that magnitude, it does have a negative impact, there's no
getting around it." Vogel, supra note 368.
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crimination add up to another failing grade for the beleaguered civil rights agen-
cy. '376 Others have gone even further, concluding that the EEOC should be sup-
planted by the private sector altogether.
377
Given this backdrop, Solutions plays a vital role in providing Coke employees
with an avenue for prompt and effective problem solving in the workplace. So
long as the EEOC and similar governmental agencies rigorously vet378 corporate
resolution systems like Solutions, 379 this alternative to the alternative can appro-
priately serve such agencies, rather than threaten them.
V. LIMITATIONS AND DRAWBACKS OF ONE-WAY BINDING
ARBITRATION
While one-way binding arbitration forges new and important ground in bridg-
ing the divide between compulsory pre-dispute binding arbitration and civil litiga-
tion, this groundbreaking approach may be further enhanced or best used in cer-
tain contexts.
A. Unilateral Obligation to Initiate Claims Through Solutions
A potential inequity of the Solutions program is its failure to require the com-
pany to use it for initiating its own legal claims. 38  When the company has a dis-
pute with the employee, it is free to proceed directly to court to litigate the mat-
ter.38 1 Solutions permits the company to assert a counterclaim in response to an
employee's request for arbitration,3 8 2 but the employer's right to assert the coun-
terclaim is not waived if it does not raise it at this time.383 Thus, the employer has
the option of raising its own claims in Solutions but is not required to do so. Solu-
tions also explicitly carves out those types of claims the company would bring
against an employee for alleged misconduct.
384
376. Id.
377. See Selmi, supra note 366, at 64 (concluding in 1996 that "the agency is clearly a failure, serv-
ing in some instances as little more than an administrative obstacle to resolution of claims on the
merits" and arguing that private attorneys are better at enforcing employment discrimination statutes).
378. See U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Pilot Program Fact Sheet "Resolving
Charges Through an Employer's Internal Dispute Resolution Program" attached to EEOC Referral
Back Letter, supra note 359 (describing necessary characteristics of employer programs participating
in pilot program).
379. General criteria for participation in the EEOC's Referral Back Pilot Program can be found at
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Questions and Answers; EEOC "Referral Back"
Mediation Pilot Program, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/mediatelreferralpilotqanda.htm (last
visited on Apr. 10, 2009). While a company must meet certain criteria to qualify for the program, the
EEOC's selection does not constitute an endorsement. Id.
380. Mar. 3, 2009, interview with Gadsden, supra note 320.
381. Id.
382. Solutions requires the company representative to deliver a position statement in response to the
employee's Request for Arbitration. Coke Rules, supra note 5, at 16. The statement must include: "a.
any defenses of the Company; and b. any claim that the Company would like to make against the
employee or former employee initiating Arbitration ('counterclaim')." Id.
383. Feb. 16, 2009, interview with Moan, supra note 210; see also E-mail from Joseph P. Moan to
Suzette M. Malveaux (Mar. 5, 2009) (on file with author). This issue, however, has not arisen to date.
Id.
384. For example, the Coke Rules explicitly state that "Solutions cannot be used:
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This unilateral obligation begs the question-if Solutions is so beneficial,
then why isn't the company required to use the program when it wants to chal-
lenge an employee's conduct? Coke provides a number of explanations.
First, Solutions is designed primarily for employees because the company al-
ready has a legal department, tasked with representing the company's interests.
385
Solutions is designed to empower the employee when challenging the company,
while giving the company an opportunity to solve the problem short of litiga-
tion.386 Solutions is meant to equalize the playing field by the giving the em-
ployee a mechanism and platform for articulating his or her grievances. The com-
pany, on the other hand, has a legal department to address its own concerns.
387
Second, the company need not bring claims through Solutions because it can
already challenge an employee's potential violations of company policy or its
Code of Business Conduct 88 through an entirely separate channel.389 In the event
that the company suspects such wrongdoing on the part of an employee-such as
an alleged intellectual property infringement-the company conducts an internal
investigation to determine whether its allegation is meritorious. 390 In the event
that the company determines that an employee has violated company policy or the
Code, it may exercise its normal managerial prerogative to discipline the em-
ployee391 without having to use Solutions, mediation, arbitration, or any other
internal resolution system. 392 The company may even choose to bring litigation
against the employee in addition to taking disciplinary action.393 To its credit,
while the company is not required to use Solutions to raise work-related issues, it
is likely to try.
394
* where prohibited by local laws
* to challenge, establish, modify, or object to the Company's policies and procedures, except
claims that allege discriminatory or inequitable application of the Company's policies or
procedures
* to resolve issues arising from workers' compensation or unemployment insurance claims
* to resolve issues arising from benefits claims, including claims covered by... [ERISA]
* to resolve issues related to an alleged breach of an Employee's non-competition, non-
solicitation, fiduciary, or confidentiality obligations
* to resolve issues related to a determination that an Employee has violated the Company's
Code of Business Conduct
* to resolve issues related to home appraisals under the Company's Relocation Program
* to resolve issues involving patents, trademarks, or intellectual property
Coke Rules, supra note 5, Section 3B, at 3.
385. Mar. 3, 2009, interview with Gadsden, supra note 320.
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. Id. Telephone interview with Edward N. Gadsden, Jr., former Coca-Cola Vice President, Human
Resources (Apr. 14, 2009) (on file with author).
389. See discussion supra at note 384 (listing exclusions).
390. Apr. 14, 2009, interview with Gadsden, supra note 388. This investigation involves the compa-
ny's legal, security and human resources departments. Id.
391. This may include termination, demotion or a reduction in pay, for example. Id.
392. Id.; see also Feb. 16, 2009, interview with Moan, supra note 383.
393. Apr. 14, 2009, interview with Gadsden, supra note 388.
394. Suzette M. Malveaux:
How does the company go about resolving problems it has with an employee? May it bypass So-
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Third, pragmatically speaking, the fact that the company is not required to af-
firmatively use Solutions may make little difference because it is rare for a com-
pany to want to bring litigation against an employee. 395 The Solutions program is
designed to handle "most work related issues," most of which are initiated by
396 397employees, not the employer.
Notwithstanding such explanations, the Solutions program could be designed
more broadly to handle issues raised by the employer. Certainly, an employer
could benefit from the same positive attributes an internal alternative dispute reso-
lution system offers an employee. Early and effective communication, flexibility,
informality, reduced costs, expediency, and privacy are just some of the positive
attributes any party could seemingly enjoy. While the company's confidence in
Solutions is demonstrated by its willingness to be bound by the arbitrator's deci-
sion--favorable or unfavorable--such confidence is somewhat belied by the un-
ilateral obligation on employees to use the program to initiate claims. The com-
pany would go even farther in building trust if it committed itself to using its own
internal dispute resolution systen---Solutions--prior to going to court.
B. Context Matters
The success of Coke's one-way binding arbitration has not taken place in a
vacuum. Coke's one-way binding arbitration has worked within the context of a
larger system of employee choices for problem resolution and a corporate culture
that values diversity.399 The arbitration step of Solutions is the fifth and final step
of a progressive series of interactions with the company. The Solutions program
itself is one of a number of ways the employee may register a complaint about a
workplace matter. The Ombuds Office400 and the Employee Reporting Service
(the confidential hotline) are additional approaches the employee may choose.
The issue has never come up. However, the Company would most likely use the Solutions
process to the extent it is feasible to resolve an issue with an associate.
Mar. 5, 2009 e-mail from Moan, supra note 383.
395. In-person interview with Cyrus Mehri, Esq., Counsel for plaintiffs in Ingram v. The Coca-Cola
Co. (Jan. 14, 2009); Dec. 24, 2008, interview with Gadsden, supra note 256.
396. Mar. 3, 2009, telephone interview with Gadsden, supra note 320.
397. See, e.g., Solutions covers issues related to:
" application of a policy or work rule
" work assignments
" overtime assignments
" transfer or promotion decisions
" written warnings or other disciplinary actions
" compensation
" treatment perceived as unfair or discriminatory
" any form of perceived harassment (e.g., sexual, racial, ethnic, religious, sexual orientation)
" personal injury, unless covered by workers' compensation.
Coke Rules, supra note 5, Section 3A, at 2-3. See also Mar. 5, 2009, e-mail from Moan, supra note
383 ("Solutions was designed to resolve legally cognizable claims. Therefore, claims about violations
in Company policies and procedures are exempt").
398. See some issues often raised by the employer listed supra at note 384.
399. Mar. 27, 2009, e-mail from Gadsden, supra note 234; Dec. 23, 2008, telephone interview with
Goldstein, supra note 296.
400. See generally Andrea McGrath, The Corporate Ombuds Office: An ADR Tool No Company
Should be Without, 18 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 452 (1997).
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For example, while there were 47 cases brought to the attention of the Diversity




there were 347 contacts made with the Ombuds Office and 69 contacts made with
the Employee Reporting Service during that same time period.402 These numbers
demonstrate the importance of offering alternative modes of communication and
dispute resolution channels. Coke's one-way binding arbitration has succeeded





Coke's one-way binding arbitration has worked in a corporate climate fo-
cused on diversity. The settlement agreement's Statement of Principle defines
diversity as a primary objective: 'The Company recognizes that diversity is a
fundamental and indispensable value and that the Company, its shareholders and
all of its employees will benefit by striving to be a premier 'gold standard' com-
pany on diversity."'4 4 Coke adopted the position "that diversity is critical to the
success of business" and, through its Diversity Advisory Councils, committed
"[s]ignificant time and resources .. .to executing 'diversity as business ' ' '4 05 in
human resources, marketing, philanthropy, and selection of suppliers. By the end
of the five-year settlement compliance period, the independent Task Force recog-
nized Coke's significant progress in achieving diversity:
[T]he Company has made major strides in changing its culture by design-
ing and implementing a comprehensive strategy that links diversity to
business goals and makes diversity a business imperative ... [T~his 'di-
versity as business' approach integrates diversity into the Company's
overall plan for growth... emphasizing comprehensive linkages between
business success and diversity .... Repeated, consistent internal commu-
nications to employees, coupled with training of senior and mid-level
managers, formed a cornerstone to ensure culture change and sustainabil-
ity.... As stewards of the diversity plan, the Diversity Advisory Coun-
cils are specifically empowered to develop annual diversity strategy and
initiatives, to monitor progress on those initiatives, and to evaluate the
Company's prgress against diversity metrics and take action to ensure
goals are met.
On September 13, 2006, Coke's Chairman and Chief Operating Officer, E.
Neville Isdell, wrote a letter to Task Force Chairwoman and Chief Operating Of-
ficer, Alexis Herman. Before the Task Force and the company met for the last
time with Judge Story, Isdell reflected on the sustainability of diversity as busi-
ness and made a long-term institutional commitment to this objective:
So let me end with one final thought around sustainability, and that's the
common ingredient to all of this work and all that's come before it: in-
401. Coke Fifth Task Force Report, supra note 1, at 46.
402. Id. at 47.
403. Dec. 23, 2008, telephone interview with Goldstein, supra note 296.
404. Coke Fifth Annual Task Force Report, supra note 1, at 2.
405. Id. at 5.
406. Id.
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vestment. Over the five years you've been here, you've seen us invest
significant time, energy, intellectual capital, resources and, most impor-
tantly, money, against our goal of being recognized the leader in diversity
and fairness. By anyone's standards, this has been a significant invest-
ment, and no corporation makes this kind of investment without a view
toward the long-term gain.
So what changes after December 1, [2006], after your report is complete
and filed with the Court? In a word, nothing.
We won't stop any of the programs we've put in place. We won't
change our practices, policies and business routines. We won't stop in-
vesting in this work, and we won't stop investing in a critical opportunity
to create sustainable growth, as well as a great place to work where all of
our employees are inspired to be the best they can be.
We'll keep enhancing our programs. We'll keep using our Insights Sur-
veys to ask employees how we're doing with regards to diversity, fair-
ness and our people programs. We'll keep holding ourselves accounta-
ble. We believe these are the things we must do if we're really serious
about sustainability.
As you begin drafting your final report to the Court, let me personally as-
sure you that this work is sustainable, that this work will go on long after
this Task Force ceases to exist, and that you will know you played a crit-
ical role in helping this great Company shape a new future.
4
0)
Not only did Coke articulate a commitment to diversity, it put its money
where its mouth is--tying incentive payments to diversity results. For example, in
2007, the company reported that twenty percent of management bonuses were
linked to diversity outcomes.4 °8 In compliance with the consent decree,4°9 starting
in 2004, company bonuses at the higher levels of management were dependent
upon progress made toward diversity objectives in female and minority represen-• 410
tation. Coke's efforts at promoting diversity yielded positive results in both raw
407. Sept. 13, 2006, letter from E. Neville Isdell, Coke's Chairman and CEO, to Alexis Herman,
Coke Task Force chairwoman, attached as Appendix B to Coke Fifth Task Force Report, supra note 1
(on file with author). At the Task Force's final meeting before Judge Story, Chairwoman Alexis Her-
man echoed this sentiment. See Transcript of Task Force Final Report Before the Honorable Richard
W. Story, Dec. 1, 2006, at 16 ("[Y]ou cannot separate the whole question of inclusion and people
practices and diversity from the growth and future of the company").
408. DIVERSrrY INC., The Top 50: The Nation's Most Credible Business Diversity List, No. 4: The
Coca-Cola Company, available at http://www.diversityinc.comlpublic/l80l.cfm (last visited Apr. 10,
2009).
409. See Abdallah et al. v. The Coca-Cola Company, No. 1-98-CV-3769 (RWS) (N.D. Ga. Nov. 16,
2000) [hereinafter Settlement Agreement], at 21, I.D.7.e ("The Task Force shall ensure that Coca-Cola
bases some appropriate proportion of incentive compensation on the Company's progress against the
Diversity Goals. This incentive shall encompass a more significant proportion of compensation for
senior management, up to and including the CEO, than for line management").
410. See Coke Fifth Annual Task Force Report, supra note 1, at 40, 43-44.
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numbers and employees' perceptions-both critical to the Solutions program's
success.
First, the independent Task Force characterized Coke's improvements, rea-
lized over the Task Force's five-year reign, from a quantitative perspective, as
"substantial":
For example, the Company made progress in diversifying its senior lea-
dership-diversity among the Company's elected and appointed officers
increased from 16% female and 8% minority in 2000 to 27% and 21%,
respectively, in 2006. That is a 68% increase in women and a 161% in-
crease in minority membership within the officer ranks in a five-year
time span. The Company also has made progress in diversifying its pipe-
line of talent to fill middle management and senior management posi-
tions. From 2002 to 2005, minorities increased from approximately 21%
to more than 27% of employees at salary grades 10-13, with all minority
groups increasing in their percentage representation within these salary
grades.
41'
The Company designed and implemented a Diversity Goals Program, a requirement of the Set-
tlement Agreement. Under the Diversity Goals Program, all senior managers based in North
America will have a portion of their incentive tied to the achievement of The Company's diversi-
ty goals. This program tracks progress on an annual basis and was implemented in January 2004.
For calendar year 2004, the program tied executive and senior manager compensation to a 2% net
increase in representation of women and minorities at salary grades 10 and above, very ambitious
goals for the first year of this program. The Task Force expressed concerns that these initial goals
were possibly too aggressive. At the conclusion of the first year of the diversity goals program,
two out of the four goals were met and two were partially met, resulting in a bonus payment of
2.5% less to senior managers. The Company continued the diversity goals program for 2005, but
adjusted the goals to set more realistic goals. The Company set goals of 1% net increase in fe-
males and minorities at salary grades 10 through 13, and for salary grades 14 and above.
Id. at40.
At the conclusion of the second year of the Diversity Goals Program, CCNA [Coca-Cola North
America] met or exceeded three of its four goals (the representation goal for women in salary
grades 14 and above was not met) for a bonus payout to senior managers which was 3.25% less
than the 20% at risk. In Corporate, senior managers received a bonus payout of 3.5% less than
the 20% at risk meeting both goals for minority representation but failing to meet goals for wom-
en at salary grades 10-13 and 14 and above.
Id. at 43-44.
In 2006, the Diversity Goals Program was modified to focus on the development and retention of
women and minorities. The filling of all positions counted toward the attainment of goals, includ-
ing hires, promotions and lateral moves.
Id. at40.
Through July 2006, CCNA is exceeding all four of its goals often by substantial margins, while
Corporate is exceeding the target for 3 of 4 goals, often substantially. Year to date [December 1,
2006], the diversity goals performance of both CCNA and Corporate would exceed the 20%
payout target.
Id. at44.
411. Id. at 6; see also id. at 16, T.4 ('"The trend since 2000 shows a substantial net increase and a
consistent improvement in minority and female representation among elected and appointed officers");
id. at 16, 17, T.5 (noting a "promising trend in minority and female representation in the pipeline jobs
to senior leadership"); see also Sakina Spruell, A Company in Recovery: Coca-Cola from Discrimina-
tion Suit to Diversity Leader, DIVERsrrY INC Jan./Feb.2007, 20, 29 (describing percentage of people of
color at Coke in 1999 and 2006).
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The company made significant progress in hiring activity toward the latter pe-
riod of the compliance period. More specifically, from October 1, 2005, through
September 30, 2006, of the 824 new hires, approximately 54 percent were women
and 47 percent were minorities, 31 percent of whom were African-Americans.
412
The company reported similar results the year prior.413 Coke also made progress
in its promotion rates.
4 14
Second, in addition to measuring success quantitatively, the Task Force de-
termined from a qualitative perspective that the company's commitment to diver-
sity had improved via an annual employee survey conducted for five years, from
2002 to 2006. As discussed supra, in 2006, the company received the highest
mean rating for diversity climate from each racial group since the survey was
initially given in 2002.4' 5 In the final year of the compliance period, there was a
"dramatic improvement" for all of the minority groups, resulting in almost no
distinction between the perceptions of Hispanics, Asian-Americans and whites.416
Moreover, the gap between African-American perceptions and those of whites had
"narrowed significantly" during the compliance period.417 Thus, the reality and
perception of diversity as a corporate value at Coke have merged.
In sum, a serious change in corporate culture--focused on diversity--not on-
ly at the highest levels of the company, but also at middle management, is neces-
418sary for an internal problem resolution system like Solutions to work. Without
systemic change throughout a company's culture, the employee trust necessary for
successful one-way binding arbitration will not develop.419 Thus, a company must
be committed to a culture of diversity in order to realize the benefits of an internal
resolution system that provides one-way binding arbitration.
C. Systemic Corporate Misconduct
Finally, while the Solutions program may be appropriate for addressing indi-
vidual employee work-related matters, it is not appropriate for resolving class
actions or other actions alleging systemic corporate misbehavior. Because of the
412. Coke Fifth Task Force Report, supra note 1, at 15, T.3.
413. Id. at 15.
414. Id. at 17, 18, T.6.
While Coke has made significant progress in diversifying its workforce since the consent decree, it
clearly has more work to do to eradicate the disparities minorities and women experience:
While minorities account for nearly 35% of all employees, they represent approximately 52% of
all support personnel in salary grades I through 8, 30% of professionals, and 22% of those at sal-
ary grades 13 and above. African Americans, who constitute 23% of the workforce, account for
42% of support personnel, 18% of professionals, and 11% of managers and executives. Women,
who represent approximately 50% of the total workforce, account for two-thirds of support per-
sonnel, 47% of professional jobs, 32% of managerial jobs and 23% of executive jobs. Since the
Settlement Agreement was signed, a larger percentage of minorities and women are now
represented in higher-level jobs.
Id. at 14. Furthermore, "involuntary termination rates were higher for minorities than for whites across
all job levels, most noticeably for executives and sales employees," during the last year of the consent
decree. See id. at 19, 20, T.8.
415. Id. at 21, 22, Fig. 2.
416. Id. at 21.
417. Id. at 22.
418. Dec. 23, 2008, telephone interview Goldstein, supra note 296.
419. Dec. 24, 2008, telephone interview Gadsden, supra note 256.
[Vol. 2009
Is it the "Real Thing"?
important role the courts 420 play in resolving cases with larger societal implica-
tions, employees must be permitted to challenge an employer's pattern or practice
of conduct without having to go through an internal company resolution process.
The judiciary's unique public function and procedural attributes make it especially
well-suited for addressing large-scale employment issues.
Scholars have long recognized that the judiciary's role is broader than resolv-
ing private disputes between parties. 421 Courts--imbued with the authority of the
state--are tasked with the larger role of defining and defending democracy.422
This broader role was articulated over a quarter-century ago by Professor Owen
Fiss, in his seminal article, Against Settlement, and later by others, who provide a
theoretical framework for the judiciary's role---referred to as the "public-life con-
ception" of adjudication.423
The public-life conception of adjudication posits that court decisions provide
an authoritative interpretation of the law, which in turn enforce societal values
embodied and reflected in the law.424 This theory states that the function of the
court system is not merely to resolve private disputes, but to safeguard public
425values. To that effect, it is not the court's job simply to maximize the interests
of private parties or merely to bring about peace, but rather to explain and give
force to the values embodied in authoritative texts, like the Constitution and fed-
eral statutes. 426 Pursuant to this theory, court judgments are necessary to ensure
that society's most fundamental democratic ideals are realized.427 For example,
adjudication would lend itself to cases where there are "significant distributional
inequalities" between the parties, or cases "where there is a genuine social need
420. Administrative agencies (such as the EEOC), along with the courts, are uniquely positioned to
address systemic issues. The EEOC has, in fact, recently identified this as a priority. In 2005, the
EEOC launched a Systems Task Force that published recommendations in 2006 for how the EEOC
could better address systemic discrimination. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
Systemic Task Force Report to the Chair of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, March
2006, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/task reports/systemic.html (last visited Apr. 10,
2009). The EEOC is empowered to bring "pattern or practice, policy and/or class cases where the
alleged discrimination has a broad impact on an industry, profession, company, or geographic loca-
tion," and has rededicated itself to this effort. Id. See also Terence Gordon, Third Annual Workplace
Class Action Report from Seyfarth Shaw of 2006: Collective Action Litigation Defines Trends for
2007, Jan. 22, 2007, available at
http://www.seyfarth.com/index.cfm/fuseaction/news-pub.news-pub-detail/object-id/dfD6cccc-f23f-
4d42-85d6-ae4f43818960/SeyfarthShawClassActionReport2007Edition.cfm (last visited Apr. 10,
2009) (predicting a rise in pattern or practice cases because of the EEOC's recent systemic discrimina-
tion initiative). For example, the EEOC filed a case against Walgreens on behalf of approximately
10,000 employees alleging race discrimination in store assignments and locations. See Diane Stafford,
Class-action lawsuit alleges discrimination at Walgreens, KANSAS CITY STAR, Mar. 8, 2007, at Cl;
See also Walgreens to pay $20 million to settle bias lawsuit, HR.BLR.COM, July 16, 2007, available at
http://hr.blr.com/news.aspx?id=76198 (last visited Apr. 10, 2009).
421. Owen M. Fiss, Comment, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1083, 1085 (1984).
422. Id. at 1085, 1089.
423. David Luban, Essay, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619, 2633-
35 (1995). But see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Essay, Whose Dispute is it Anyway?: A Philosophical and
Democratic Defense of Settlement (in Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663, 2694-95 (1995).
424. Fiss, supra note 421, at 1085.
425. Id. at 1083, 1085-86.
426. Id. at 1085-86.
427. Id. at 1086-87.
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for an authoritative interpretation of law., 428 Under the public-life conception, the
judiciary plays an important role in not only resolving individual disputes, but in
safeguarding democracy through process.
The court system's numerous procedural safeguards enable it to play this uni-
quely critical role. A subsidized forum gives people access. Discovery affords
the parties an opportunity to fully prosecute their claims or defend themselves. A
jury trial offers a standard set by one's peers. A written record and trial provide
transparency, accountability, and deterrence. Binding legal precedents create
uniform enforcement of the law, predictability, and stability. Appellate review
ensures proper checks and balances. Altogether, these features lend credence and
legitimacy to the outcome-which is particularly important where the stakes are
high and the impact on the public is large. Indeed, Coke itself recognizes the
impropriety of its Solutions program for addressing systemic, company-wide con-
duct.4 9 While one-way binding arbitration offers many advantages, its limitations
are important to recognize.
VI. CONCLUSION
Even considering some of the limitations of one-way binding arbitration, giv-
en its transformative potential, employers and employee advocates should consid-
er it as an alternative to compulsory binding pre-dispute arbitration, subject to
certain important safeguards. One-way binding arbitration should emphasize
employee choice, by allowing employees to select alternative ways of communi-
cating and resolving problems with the employer, in addition to allowing em-
ployees to go to court instead of accepting the outcome of arbitration. In addition
to preserving access to the courts, one-way binding arbitration should take place
in an internal process with key safeguards that, at a minimum, toll the statute of
limitations, cover significant costs, offer robust discovery, and provide transpa-
rency and accountability through hearings, written records, and review proce-
dures. With such features in place, this alternative to the alternative provides
employers enormous benefits such as confidential and amicable resolution of
workplace disputes, reduction of EEOC charges and litigation, and improved em-
ployee relations, while respecting the due process rights of the employees. One-
way arbitration also provides employees an alternative way of seeking the relief
they deserve but may not receive under the current administrative agency re-
straints and federal court system climates. Finally, one-way binding arbitration
offers society another option along the continuum between mandatory pre-dispute
arbitration and civil litigation-forcing society to reconsider the desirability of
428. Id. at 1087.
429. E-mail from Joseph P. Moan to Suzette M. Malveaux (Mar. 27, 2009) (on file with author); E-
mail from Edward N. Gadsden, Jr. to Suzette M. Malveaux (Mar. 27, 2009) (on file with author). The
Coke Rules also state:
Solutions cannot be used ... to challenge, establish, modify, or object to the Company's policies
and procedures, except claims that allege discriminatory or inequitable application of the Com-
pany's policies or procedures ....
Coke Rules, supra note 5, at 3 Section 3,B. (emphasis added). Only individual application of Coke's
policies or procedures are covered by Solutions, not collective or class actions. See Mar. 27, 2009 e-
mail from Moan, supra note 429.
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each and how they might be reconciled. One-way binding arbitration--it just
might be the "real thing. 43 °
430. Fittingly, at the final meeting with the counsel and the Task Force, Judge Story recognized
Coke's Human Resources System, of which Solutions is a part, as a potential model:
They're proud of what they have done. They [the Task Force] want to tell the world about what
they have done. You know, they are proud of this. They want other people to mimic it.
See Transcript of Task Force Final Report Before the Honorable Richard W. Story, Dec. 1, 2006, at
21-23. See also Dec. 23, 2008, telephone interview with Goldstein, supra note 296 (on file with au-
thor) (describing Solutions as "the best that was out there").
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